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Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 2305 
, LOUIS C. BARLEY .A.ND MARGARET E. TRUCKEN-
MILLER, EXECU".rOR AND EXECUTRIX, &C., 
,Appellants. 
versus · 
JAMES M. DUNCAN, JR., ADMINISTRATOR OF 'THE 
ESTATE OF JAMES M. DUNCAN, SR., DECEASED, 
MARY V. DUNC.A;N, WIDOW, ET ALS., Appellees. 
PETITION FOR AN APPEAL AND 
SUPERSEDE.AS. . . 
. To the Honorable Chief Justice and the Associate Justices 
of the Sitpreme Court of Appeals of Virginia: 
Petitioners, Louis C. Barley and Margaret E. Trucken-
miller (formerly Margaret E. Deike), Executor and Execu-
trix under the last will and testament of the late Harley P. 
Wilson (hereinafter designated as appellants), respectfully 
repreRent unto your Honors that they are aggrieved, by acer-
tain decree entered against them in the Corporation Court of 
the City of Alexandria, Virginia, at its January Term, 1940, 
to-wit, February 1, 1940 (Trs., p. 50), .in the above-entitled 
suit. The decree complained of denies appellants' right to 
enforce seven judgments agg·regating $2,900.00 as of the date 
of. the entry of said decree exclusive ·of costs, and decrees sale 
of certain real estate without de.finite ascertainmnt of an al-
leged lien on a parcel thereof, and the ownership of and title 
to. certain parcels thereof. 
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*STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
On the 26th day of June, 1939, G. B. Wallace and George 
W. Herring, co-partners, trading and doing business as Wal-
lace and Herring, a judgment creditor of one J a.mes M. Dun-
can, Sr., intestate, deceased, filed a general creditors' suit 
(and bill of complaint filed July 19th, 1939, Trs., p. 1) in the 
Corporation Court of the City of Alexandria, Virginia, im-
pleading the administrator and heirs of said decedent, the 
beneficiary under a deed of trust of record, and all other per-
sons who are or might be interested in the subject-matter of 
said suit, whose names are unknown, as parties unknown, 
to subject the estate real and personal of whfol1 said in-
testate died seised a.nd -possessed to the payment of complain-
ants' judgment and other liens binding thereon. 
Robert H. Cox and Rose M. Keane and Bessie M. Posey 
and Paul L. Posey filed petitions therein. The matters raised 
by these petition~ are not germane to the questions now pre-
sented and hence said petitions are not included in the agreed 
transcript of the record. 
On the 31st day of July, 1939, the administrator and heirs 
of the said intestate, filed their answer to the bill of com-
plaint (Trs., p. 6). By decree entered on the 3rd day of Au-
gust, 1939, the Court ref erred the ca use to Commissioner 
Hannon E. Norris, for report, inter alia, of the estate, real 
and personal of whic-h the said James l\L Duncan, .Sr., died in-
testate, seised and possessed and the liens binding thereon 
(Trs., p. 8). By decrees entered on August 22, 1939, the 
3• Court ref erred to the said Commissioner *for report the 
matters in issue under the petitions of R-0bert H. Oox 
and Rose J\f. Keane and Bessie M. and Paul L. Posey (Trs., 
pp. 9-10). 
By decree entered on the 22nd day of August, 1939, the 
Chancellor in the Lower Court granted appellants leave to 
:file their petition for the collection of said judgments in the 
said cause which was forthwith done and such petition was 
properly matured (Trs., p. 11). The purpose of this petition 
wa8 to have the real estate and personal property of .James 
M. Duncan, Sr., intestate, deceased, subjected to the payment 
of eight judgments obtained against him in his lifetime by 
sundry parties, all of which judgments were duly docketed 
and assigned of reco-i.·d to Hadey P. Wilson for value re-
ceived, during the lifetime of the said tT ames M. Duncan, Sr., 
and of the said Harley P. W"ilson. Said assignee paid full 
value for said judgments. 
Pursuant to the said decree of reference, Commissioner 
Norris filed his report in said cause on October 31, 1939 (Trt?,, 
L. C. Barley, et als., v. J. M. Duncan, Jr., .A.dm 'r: etc. 3 
p. 22). To said report appellants duly filed their written 
exceptions on November 9, 1939 (Tr~., p. 44). After oral ar-
gument of the said exceptions, the Chancellor filed a written 
memorandum of his opinion (Tr., p. 18), and sustained said 
exceptions in part but overruled the exceptions so filed to the 
report of the Commissioner reporting that the seven judg-
ments reported by him therein aggregating exclusive of costs, 
$2,900.00, obtained against the said James M. Duncan, Sr., 
during his lifetime, and duly assigned of record and for value 
to Harley P. Wilson, were barred by the statute of limi-
4* tations and did not constitute liens *upon the estate, real 
and personal, which said judgment debtor owned at the 
date of said judgments and the real estate of which he died 
seised. By decree (from which an appeal is sought, Trs., p. 
50), entered in said cause on the 1st day of February, 1940, 
predicated upon his memorandum of opinion filed (Trs., p. 
50), the Chancellor overruled exception No. 1 filed to the re-
port, which relates to the failure of the Commissioner to re-
port the present holder of and the amount due under an al-
leged deed of trust indebtedness and exceptions numbered 2, 
3, 5 and 7 which relate to the report of the Commissioner that 
the aforesaid seven judgments were barred by the statute or 
1.imitations and to the failure of the Commissioner to ascer-
tain and report definitely respecting· the ownership of and 
title to certain portions of the real estate in the bill and pro-
ceedings mentioned; sustained exception No. 4 to said report 
that a counsel fee of ~350.00 should he paid to complainants~ 
counsel from the fund to be derived in the said cause; and 
sustained in part exception No. 6 to the report of the Com-
missioner which set up a fee of $800.00, decreasing this fee 
from $800.00 t.o $750.00. In tl1is Honorable Court no review 
is sought of the a.llowance of $750.00 to the Commissioner for 
fee and cost of his report. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS. 
As reported by the Commissioner, the judgment debtor, 
.James 1VI. Duncan, Sr., died intestate, June 17, 1936. His son, 
.James M. Duncan, Jr., duly qualified as Administrator on his 
personal estate on the 28th day of June, 1937, as alleged in tbe 
bill of complaint. The said H~ rley P. Wilson, purchaser 
5* for value *and assignee of record of the seven judgments 
reported as barred, died testate, on the 23rd day of No-
vember, 1934, and appellants were duly appointed and quali-
fied on .November 30, 1934, as Executor and Executrix under 
his last will and testament and codicils thereto appended. 
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ASSLGNMENTS OF ERROR. 
One: The Chancellor erred in overruling· appellants' ex-
~eptions numbered 2, 3, 5 and 7, :filed to the report of the 
Commissioner, holding that the seven aforesaid judgments 
assigned of record to t~e sai4 Harley P. Wilson were barred 
by the statute of lir.nitatj.ons and in decreeing that said judg-
ments are so .barred and do not .constitu~e liens upon the real 
estate owned .by,the said. judgment.debtor, at..the·date of the 
recovery of said judg1nents; and· as of the date .of_his death. 
Two: The; .Chan~ellor. erred in overruling appellants' ex-
ception No. 1. to_.the failure. __ of. the Commissioner, to ~scertain 
and de:finitety. re.port the ,present :holder .of .. an alleged note 
- of. $800.00 ·a;nd the am~\mt, if :any, due· thereon) reported by 
said Commissioner as heing) .secured hy. a· deed of .. trust re-
corded in Liber I, No. 10, page 454% of the lan_d records of 
_Fairfax Courity,= Virginia, conveying- 68 lots of Ian.a in· Hig-
bie 's Addition° B-Vernon on tlie · Potomac situated in said 
County, and· in ·entering the· de.cree· of sale appointing Com-
missioners· ·of· ,Sale to make sale ~of·-;said real estate 'without 
first defhiitely:. ascertaining· th~ holder of said· dnde"btedness 
and the amount, if any, unpaid:~hereon. r·; · · 
6* *'lJhTee :- : ~The Chancellor erred in ovei'ruling the por ... 
tion .of appellants' exception No. 5 directed to the. failure 
of the Commissioner to definitely ascertain ·and•·' repod 
whether'.or, not: s.undry lots in Block· No. '36 · and Block No. 
41, to-wit,: Lots Numbered 6, 7, 8, 9, and' 10 in Block 31 and 
Lots N umbeted· 1-5 to 28, inclusive, · 32, -33· and 45 ~ to 48, in-
clusive, in 'Block-··41, of Alfred Higbie 's Addition B-:Vernon 
on the Potomac, -were owned by decedent, .J a.mes M. Duncan,, 
Sr.; and in ·ent~ring the decree of sale and appointing Com-
missioners~:to ·sell' the real estate of ,vhich ·the said intestate 
died seised and possessed, without ~-having first•de:finifely: as-
certained whether or not said deeedent owned said lots. 
.. \ ... 
FIRST ASSIGiN:ME,NT OF ERROR. 
This assig1mie11t is directed to so much of the decree ap-
pealed from as holds that of the eight judgments held by ap-
pellants' testate against the said James M. Duncan, seven 
of said judgments, aggregftting, exelusive of costs as of the 
date of said dec-ree $2,900.00, are barred by the statute of 
limitations, and involves the question as to whether or not 
the provisions of Code Section 5809 apply to a proceeding 
in equity .to enforce judgment liens. 
The judgments so reported to he barred are as follows: 
L. C. Barley, et als., v. J.M. Duncan, Jr., Adm'r, etc. 5 
Julian ~,. Chauncey & Son for $176.80, with interest from 
.July 17, 1928, and costs, recovered on the 25th day of Sep· 
tember, 1928, in the Civil and Police Court for the City of 
.Alexandria, Virg·ipia. On this judgment fi. fa. was issued 
September 25, 1928, returnable 60 days after date, with no 
return thereon· endorsed. · · 
7* . •sw.an Broi,. Inc., for $130.00 with interest from July 
10, 1928, .and costs, recovered at the October Term, 1.928, 
of the Corporation Court for the City of Alexandria, Vir-
ginia. No fi. fa. was issued thereon . 
. Ridgely -& Jones fo·r $78.71, with interest from Novemher 
21, 1927, and costs, recovered on December 11, 100S, before 
the Civil and Polfoe co·urt of the City of Alexandria, Virginia. 
No writ of fi. fa. was issued thereon. 
Henry P. Thonias for $100.50, with interest from N ovem-
her 9, 1928, ~nd costs, recoverHd December 18, 1.928, before 
the Civil and Police · Court of' the City of Alexandria, Vir-
gm1a. Fi. fa . . wa·s issued·tbereon ·on December 18, 1928, re-
turnable 60 · days after· date, with no return thereon endorsed. 
John T. Worthington for "$526.13, with interest from De-
-cemlJer 27, 1928, ana costs, recovered on December 27, 1928, 
before the s·aid Civil and Polic.~ Court. No fi. fa. was issued 
thereon. · '. · · · · 
D. E: Bayliss· ·for ·$400.00," with fnterest from October 6, 
1928, and ·costs recovered. ·on ·December '27, 1928, before the 
said Civil aiid Police Court: No , fi. fa·. was issued thereon. 
J obn T. Worthington foi $319.90, wrth interest from J anu-
ary 3, 1929, and costs recovered on the 3rd ~ay of January, 
1929, l,ofore the said Civil ·aud · Police Court. No fi. fa,_. was 
issued thereon. . ',,' . ' ' ' . . 
As stated, all of said judgments . we·re a.ssignecl for value 
received of record to I-Ia:rley P. 'Wilson. 
Althoug·h not" determinative of the question, it is piterest• 
ing to note that neither tbe administrator and heirs at law 
of the said judgment debtor, nor any ereditor, interposed the 
})lea of the statute of limitations to said judgments. 
Preliminary to the discussion of this assignment the rea-
son given by the Oommissioner and the Chancellor for their 
respective report and decree that the judgments in question 
are barred, will be considered. 
8* 6 The Commissioner predicates his opinion upon his 
conclusion that the only applicable section of our Code 
is Section 6477; that the question as to whether or not said 
judgments are barred is determined in the affirmative by 
the case of Handy and another v. Smith'.c; .A.dmr., 30 W. Va. 
195, 3 S. E. 604; that Section 5809 of the Code of Virginia, 
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excluding the period of one year from the death of any party 
in the computation of time for the enforcement of said judg-
ments does not apply as said section was held not to apply 
to real actions in the case of Steffey v. King 126 Va. 120, 101 
S. E. 62. 
We submit, the Commissioner, in stating that the H(}/ndy 
v. 81nith (\¥. Va.) case, is "Exactly in point", and decides 
that the seven judgments in question are barrP.d~ misapplied 
the decision and extended it to embrace judicial construction 
of a statute, (to-wit, our present Code Section 5809), which 
did not exist in the jurisdiction in which the decision in ques-
tion was rendered and which statute was not before the Court 
for construction. The legislature of the State of West Vir-
ginia never adopted any act similar to either our orig-inal 
Code Section 2919 ( Code of 1887), or 5809 of our Code of 
1936. Burks Pleading and Practice, footnote 13, Section 212, 
page 369. The error of the Commissioner in such construc-
tion and application of this case is, we believe, manifest. 
Likewise the Commissioner erred, we submit, in applying 
the decision in the Steffey v~ K in,r; case, su,pra, to the· rip:hts 
sought to be enforced by appellants in this proceeding. He 
states that in the Steffey case, it was held that section 5809 
of our Code, does not apply to real actions. Even though 
H* $this case so held, which we do not admit as will be here-
inafter set forth under the discussion of pertinent au-
thorities, the error of the Commissioner is manifest, when he 
applies such construction of the decision to the personal ac-
tions of appellants in this cause. Appellants are not seeking 
to enforce a real cause of action, but purely a personal right, 
for· the enforcement of a statutory lien. This lien is not an 
equitable one, lnd a legal on<~. Flanary v. Kane_. 102 Va. 547, 
page 559 of the opinion. 
The status of· a judgment creditor in respect to the real 
estate of his debtor, is no long·er an open question in this juris-
diction, but has been clearly defined. On the point, this Hon-
orable Court, speaking throug·h Buchanan, J., in the Kane 
case, page 557 of the opinion, stated: 
"The su,it of a judgment crP;d#or fo en.f fJrce his lien against 
land is not a su,it to recover if. He has no right to the pos-
se.~sion of the land.'' 
Ag·ain, in the case of McClanahan's Adnir. v. N. & W. Ry. 
Co., 122 Va. 705, in elaboration of the language of the ma-
jority opinion on such status (pages 719 and 721), Burks, .J., 
in his strong dissenting· opinion from the decision of tlte ma-
jor point there involved, whic.h point is not germane to the 
• 
' · L. C. Barley, et als., v. tT. M. Duncan, Jr., Adm 'r, etc. 7 
question here presented, states, pages 739-740 of the opinion: 
'' The judgment creditor has no interest in the land of his 
debtor. He has neither a jus in re nor a jus ad rem. He 
has no rig·ht to the possession. He has simp]y a lien upon 
the land, and the right to subject it to the discharge of that 
lieu. The duration of that lien is prescribed by statute, and 
during the time prescribed he may enforce it in equity.'' 
The learned Chancellor, in his opinion (Trs., p. 47), assigns 
the following reasons for holding· that Section 5809 o.f 
10* the Code *does not apply to a proceeding in ·equity to 
enforce judgment liens. 
First: Because if said section applied, there would be no 
necessity for some of the exceptions of Section 6478. 
We respectfully submit that analysis of the two sections 
mentioned does not support this conclusion on the part of the 
Chancellor. Section 5809 provides that the period of one year 
from the death of any party shall be excluded from the com-
putation of time within which by the operation of any stat-
u.te, or rule of law, it may be necessary to conimence an.y pro-
ceeding to preserve or vreven.t the loss of any right or remedy. 
Section 6478 of the Code provides that no execution shall 
issue, nor any scire .fac.ias, or action be brought, on a judg. 
ment in this State, other than for the Commonwealth, after 
the time prescribed by Section 6477, except that, in compt1t-
ing the time, any time during which the right to sue out exe-
cution on the judgment is suspended by the terms thereof, 
or by legal process, shall he omitted. It is certainly clear 
that this proviso was neither embraced in nor made necessary 
by the provisions of Section 5809. Section 6478 then further 
provides that in all actions on judgments, except where the 
jndgment is for the penalty of a bond, that Code .Sections 
5823-4-5-6, inclusive, and Section 5830, shall apply to the right 
to bring such action or sr.ire facias. Section 5823 protects 
the rights of persons under disabilities. Section 5824 the 
rights of any party dying before the time at which said right 
wou]d have accrued to him if he had continued alive; Sec-
tion 5825 relates to claims ag-aiust n. resident of this State, 
who, by departing from the same, absconding or con-
] 1 * cealing himself, etc., prevents the collection thereof; 
*Section 5826 for the exclusion of the time during whieh 
nn action or suit mav be abated for the reasons therein as-
sig·ned aucl Section 5830 for the limitation on actions or suits 
pending the day before the Code of ln36 took effect, etc. 
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Second: Because Section 5809 is part of Chapter 238, limi-
tation of suits, and Sections 6477 and 6478 are not a part of 
this Chapter, nor related to it, but pertinent to limitation of 
proceedings on judgments. · 
Bearing in mind that Sections 6477 and 6478 are not those 
character of statutes, which in themselves, create a right 
and fix the limitation of time in which said right is to be en-
forced, we submit there is no merit in this reason assigned 
by the Chancellor. 
Third: Because under the opinion expressed in Harpe·r, 
et als. v. Harper, et als., 159 Va~ 216, a proceeding in equity 
to enforce the collection of a judgment is a real action and in 
Steffey v. K·ing, s'u,pra, it was held that Section 5809 did not 
apply to real actions. · 
In this reasoning·, the learned Chancellor falls into the 
same error as the Commissioner, whose view he adopts, to-
wit, that ·an equity proceeding· to enforce the collection of a 
judgment .is a real action. Such is not the fact as established 
alike hv the decisions of this Honorable Court and textbooks 
dealing wjth the classification of actions. Further, in the 
Harper case; as will be liereinafter pointed out, the section 
in question was .applied in an equity proceeding in behalf of 
the holder of an open note against a decedent, which note, uu-
der the statute. law of this jurisdiction, constituted a· statutory 
lien upon the estate, real and personal, of the deceased debtor, 
the period of one year from the date of the death of said 
debtor being· excluded from the ·period of time within 
12"" which an actiqn was required to be brought •to recover 
on said note. 
Fourth: Because the cases prior to Steffey v. King, e"t al., 
_s·upra, do not construe the applicability of Section 5809 ( then 
Section 3577) to real actions, for in Janies's Executor, et al., 
v. Life, 92 Va. 702, the plaintiff was within the time limit, 
independently of the section and Fadeley' s Admr. v. 1Villiams' 
.A dnir .. , 96 Va. 397, was not a suit to subject real estate. 
The Janies's case was cited before the Chancellor in the oral 
argument, as authority for the proposition, that appellants 
could proceed in equity to enforce the judgments in ques-
tion without first reviving same by scire facias against the 
administrator and heirs at law of the decedent; and in further 
support of the law that the right to file a bill in eq-µity to 
L. C. Barley, et als., v. ,J. "M. Duncan, ,Jr., .A.dm 'r, etc. 9 
enforce a judgment lien is co-extensive, as to time with the 
right to sue out execution on said judgment . 
. The Fadeley case-.a proceeding by scire facias on faflts 
similar to those here iuvolved-:-was cited before the Chan-
cellor in support qf the proposition that under the provisious 
of then Code Section 2919 (.now 5809 )-one year fron1 -the 
qualification of a personal representative-now one year from 
the death of a party, should be excluded in the computation 
of time within which a scire f acias bad to be sued out upon 
a judgment against a decedent. In short, the learned Chan .. 
.cellor inferentially admits that had appellants been- seeking 
to revive said seven judgments by scire facias, they would 
not be barred from so doing, but that as they are proceedin~ 
in equity for the collection thereof, computation of the limi-
tation of time on their right to so do is not to be suspended 
under the provisions of Section 5809 of our Code. The 
error in this reasoning of the learned Chancellor is, 
13* *we believe, manifest under the decision in the case of 
Flanary v. Kane, supra, where Buchan·an, J., speaking 
for this Honorable Court, page 557 of the opinion, states : 
'' Section 3573 provides that no suit shall be brought to 
enforce the· lien of a judgment, upon which the right to issue 
~.n execution, or· bring a sci re f a.cias, or action, is barred by 
Sections 3577 and 3578. 'I'his ·i1nplies., as has been freq'l1:ently 
decided, that as long as the right to issue an execution, or 
br·in.Q n. scire facias, or action. exists! the lien may be enforced 
in eqiiity.'' 
To the same effect is the decision in the James' s case. 
The Fadeley case held that the one-year period of suspen-
sion provided by then Code Section 2919, applied to writs of 
.scire .facias. The Flanary v. Kane case holds that if a scire 
.facias can be issued, an equity suit can be conducted for the 
cnf orcement of the judgment lien, as · appellants are seek-
ing- to do in this cause. 
Fifth: Because the Legislature, in 1922, with the construc-
tion in the Steffey v. King case, supra, before it, amended 
Section 5827 ('' a section which dealt with certain statutory 
limitatjons of ·real actions"), to provide that a period of one 
year from the death of any party in interest, be excluded 
from computation of time and did not amend Section 5809 
. and that it is, therefore, to be presumed the Legislature in-
tended Section 5809 to remain as construed, namely, not to 
apply to real actions. 
10 Sup'.!:eme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Again the Chancellor is in error in his reasoning and in 
his construction of Section 5827, which he states, deals with 
real actio1zs. Bv reference ·to said Code 8ection. it will be 
seen that it relates solely to liens created by deeds of trust 
or mortg·ag·cs and the period for the enforcement of such 
liens, under which liens personal rights are created, not real 
actions. 
Further the amendment of the- stated one-year period 
14* to this *section was meaningless and not necessary, as 
Section 5809 carried the identical provision. Address 
of C. H. l\.forrissett, Director of the State Legislative Refer-
ence Bureau, VII Va. Law Reg. N. S., page 97. 
Even though the decision in the case 1of Steff1.1y v. King~ 
supra, is to be construed to the effect that Section 5809 does 
not apply to real actions, which, as heretofore stated, we do 
not admit, and which we will hereafter endeavor to demon-
strate, such construction of the decision has no bearing upon 
the question here presented, as an equity proceeding to en-
force the lien of a judgment is not a real action. The Chan-
ceUor, we respectfully submit, erred in his conclusion that 
such a proceeding is a real cause of action and predicated 
l1is decision and decree upon such erroneous· conrlusion ancl 
erroneously applied as controlling the decision in the case 
of Steffey v. King. The lang11ag·e of Section 5809 is, we sub-
mit, too plain and all inclusive to necessitate judicial con-
struction. The legislature thereby m·eated a g·eneral suspen-
sion period and the statute by its very terms, stops the run-
ning of any statute of limitations in the event of the death 
of a party as thereby expressly provided. We wilI now re-
view the history of this Section and pertinent decisions of 
this Honorable Court on its application. 
Preliminary to further discussion of the question, it may 
tend to perspicuity to state the legal principles, and insofar 
as deemed necessary, to cite the authorities relied upon by 
appellants in support of their contention that Section 5809 
is applicable and that said seven judgments are not barred 
by t,hP. statute of limitation~ and constitute valid and 
15o11, ~ul)sistin,g liens. ""both upon the renl estate owned by in-
testate as of the recovery of sa.id judgments, and upon 
anv additional real estate of which he died seised and pos-
sessed. Such principles and authorities are as follows: 
l. A judgment creditor has no interest in the land of hfa 
debtor. He has neither a jU,s in re nor a ju,s ad rem,. He J1as 
no right to the pos~ession. He has simply a lien upon the 
land, and the right to subject it to the discharge of that lien. 
Flana1·11 v. Kane, supra, page 557 of the opinion; IJfcClana-
L. C. Ba.rley,. et als., v. J. M. Duncan, Jr., Adm 'r: etc. 11 
han's .Admr. v. N .. ct W. Ry. ·co., supra. Pages 721-739 and 
7 40 of the opinion. 
2. A suit by a judgment creditor to enforce the lien of hi~ 
judgment is not a real action. Real actions are for the re-
covery of land only-at common law, a freehold estate onJy, 
by statutes generally a less estate than freehold may also 
be recovered. In Virginia the only refl.1 Hction is unlawful 
entry or detainer or forcible entry. Burks Pleading and 
Practice, Third Ed., page 140. . · 
3: Real actions are those brought for the specific rec01Jet·y 
of land, tenements or heredit'a·ments, Rome being founded on 
the seizure or possession and some on the property or rig·ht. 
Am. Jur. 1, page 430. 
4. The right of a judg·ment creditor arising ex contnwtu, 
on which classes of actions the seven judgments were founded, 
is a personal right. The creditor's right of enforcement of 
collection of the judgment upon his death survives to hi.~ per-
sonal representatives. "\¥hile true that tl1e manner of en-
forcement may, by necessity, take on a quasi in rem charac,... 
ter, yet the means used to cnf orce the ,right does not 1nake the 
action a real one. Am. Jur. 1, page 437; Pcwnoyer v. Neff-', 
95 U. S. 714; 24 L. Ed. 565. 
5. Appellants can proceed in equity to enforce the liens 
of said judg·ments ag·ainst the administrator and heirs at law 
of the judgment debtor, James M. Duncan, Sr., deceased, as 
long as the right to issue au execution or bring a scire fadas 
or action thereon exists, and can proceed in equity without 
first reviving such judgment at law. Flanary v. Kane, s1tpra, 
page 507; J(J/trl,es's Exec. and others, v. Life, supra. 
6. Upon the assig11ment of record of the said seven judg-
ments to the said Harley P. ·wuson, he became the judgment 
plaintiff of record, and appel1a.nts~ as his Executor and Execu·-
trix, became vested with all of his rights to enforce the pay-
ment thereof. Section 6471A of the Code of Virginia (Michie) 
1936. . 
16*~ *7. Harley P. V{ilson, .Assig11ee of said judgments, 
died November 23, 1934, and immediately upon his death, 
the ten-year period, under the pro,Tisions of Section 6477 of 
the Code, for the enforcement of said judgments, became 
eleven years so that the earliest one of said judgments held 
by thf! Chancellor to be barred, to-wit, the ,Judgment of Julian 
F. Chauncey & Son, for $176.80, with interest from July 17, 
1928, recovered September 25, 1928 ( see report of Commis-
sioner), on which judgment execution was issued September 
25, 1929, returnable in 60 days and on which execution no 
return was made, did not become barred until eleven years 
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from the return date, to-wit, November 23, 1939. Section 
5809 of the Code; Fadeley's .Admr. v. Williwms, sitpra. 
8. The judgment debtor, James M. Duncan, Sr., died in-
testate June 17, 1936, and immediately upon his death the 
eleven-year period for. the enforcement of said judgments 
became twelve years, so that judgment first obtained did not 
become barred until November 23, 1940. Section 5809 of the 
Code of Virginia, supra; Fadeley case, su,pra; Ha·rper, et als. 1 
v. Harper, et als., supra. 
9. This suit, a general creditqrs' suit, in which appellants, 
with leave of Court :first obtained, filed their petition, was 
filed June 26, 1939, one year, four months and twenty-seven 
days before the earliest one of said judgments would have 
become barred. Upon the institution of this suit, the run-
ning of the statute of limitations for the enforcement of said 
judgments, was immediately suspended. Section 5826.A, Code 
of Virginia; Harper case, supra. 
The history of said Section : 
In its early form, Section 2919 ( Code of 1887), provided 
that the period between the 17th day of April, 1861, and the 
2nd day of March, 1866, should be excluded from the compu-
tation of the time within which by the terms or operation of 
any statute or rule of law, it might be necessary to commence 
any action or other proceeding·, or to do any other act to p1·e-
vent or preserve the loss of any civil right or remedy, or to 
avoid any fine, penalty, or forfeiture; and that the period be-
tween the 2nd day of 1'farch, 1866, and the 1st day of 
17* ,January, 1869, should be excluded *from the computa-
tion of time within which by the operation of any stafote 
o·r rule of law, it mig·ht be necessary to commence any pro-
ceeding to preserve or prevent the loss of any right or remedy. 
It was amended by the Acts of 1887-8, page 345, by adding 
thereto the proviso that '' the period of one year from the 
qualification of a personal represcntatiYe'' shquld be excluded 
in computing the time on any sta.tnte of limitations, etc. The 
section, as so amended, stood until the Acts of 1895-6, page 
331, when it was re-enacted with the substitution for the 
"period of one year from the date of the qualification of a 
personal representative'' the proviso '' and the period of one 
)rear from the death of any party", should be excluded from 
the computation of time within which, by the operation of 
an11 stafote or ritle of law, it may be necessary to commence 
any proceeding to preserve or prevent the loss of any right 
or remedy''. As so amended, it was carried into the codifi-
cation of the Code of 1904 and remained as the statute law 
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of this State until the recodification of the Code of 1919 and 
in such recodification and· adoption by the legislature, said 
-0riginal Code Section (2919, Code of 1887), was codified with 
the elimination therefrom. (then unnee~ssary) of tl1e stay law. 
feature theretofore ex.it:itent therein and the continuation of 
the last paragraph of said original section, as amended, Acts 
of 1895-96, page 331, as the statute law of this State, now . 
present Code Section 5809 of our 1936 Code. The conclud-
ing paragraph of the Acts of 1895-96, present Code Section 
5809, is now, for the convenience of this Honorable Court, 
<if.uoted, to-wit: 
''The period of one year from the death of any party shall 
he excluded from the computation of time within which, by 
the operation of any statute or rule of lOIW, it may be 
18* necessary "'to commence a.ny proceeding to preserve 01· 
prevent ·the loss of any right or remedy.'' (Italics used 
herein are ours unless otherwise noted.) 
Pertinent decisions of this Honorable Court, under original 
Code Section 2919 (Code of 1887), and present Code Section 
5809 (Code of 1936) germane to the question under consid-
eration will now be reviewed in their chronological order. 
Hill, et als., v. Rixey and Starke, et als., 26 Gratt. 72, de-
cided March 25, 1875. In this case, the question unde:r con-
sidcmti on waR whether or not certain undocketed judgments 
took priority over a deed of trust recorded prior to their 
docketing. The recording act, then paragraph 8, chapter 186, 
of the Code of 1860, provided that as against a purchaser 
for valuable consideration without notice, no judgment op-
erated as a lien upon real estate unless it was docketed witllin 
twelve months from its date, or 90 days before a conveyance 
to such purchaser. The judgment creditors elaiming pri-
, ority over a deed of trust recorded prior to the docketing 
of their judgment invoked the· stay law provision, which, as 
stated, provided that the period between the 17th day of 
April, 1861, and the 2nd day of March, 1866, should be ex-
cluded from the computation of time within which they were 
required to docket said judgments as against a purchaser for 
valuable consideration, to-wit, the deed of trust creditor~ Such 
construetion of the statute was adopted on the appeal. 
Staples, J., in deciding the point and speaking for this Hon-
orable Court, page 75 of the opinion, says : 
"Now, it is very clear that 'docketing a judgment' is 'an 
. act to be done'. By the provisions of th_e 8th Section, 
19* *Chapter 186, Code of 1860, already cited, it is to be 
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done within twelve months from the date of. the jndg-
ment or 90 days before a conveyance. That is directly within 
the saving of the first section of the Acts of :March 2, 186~ 
and does not, I think, admit of question. The proposition 
is too plain for argument. My opinion therefore is that the 
period between the 17th of April, 1861, and the 2nd of March,. 
1866, is to be excluded wholly from the computation in de-
termining whether the judgment was docketed in sufficient 
time to preserve the lien.'' 
Borst v. NaUe, et al., 28 Gratt. 423, decided April 19, 1877. 
Decision rendered by Bit.,rks, ,T., and follows the decision in the 
case of Hill, et a.ls., v. Rixey and Starke, et als., si1rpra. In 
the Bor.c;t case the appellee, Nalle, recovered a judgment 
-against William B. Ross and ,James A. Beckham, in N ovem-
ber, 1860. ~/.'his judgme1it was not docketed until the /Jrd day 
of November, 1865. At the date of the judgment the judgment 
debtor, Beckham, was seised of several parcels of real estate 
in the County of Culpeper, in which County said judg1nent 
was obtained. 
Beckham, by deed dated the 10th day of December: 1862, 
and duly recorded on the 11th day of December, 1862, nearly 
two years prior to the date of the docketing of the judgment, 
conveyed said real estate to John Minor Botts and Frank]in 
Stearns. An additional conveyance of real estate was ma<le 
between the date of the judgment and the docketing thereof 
to Wil1iam B. Ross, who, in turn conveyed to Peter B. Borst. 
Borst filed ]1is answer denyfog that the said judgment was a 
, lien on the land acquired by him, because, as he averred, the 
judgment was not docketed within the time prescribed by 
law and was not docketed before the conveyance of the said 
land to him. 
20* "Judge Burks after stating: 
'' This objection, we had supposed, was fuIIv answered by 
the decision in Hill v. Rixey, et als., 26 Gratt. 72, made by 
this Court since an appeal was allowed in this case;" 
i.n an able discussion of tl1e growth of judgments into liens 
and of the stay law provision of then Code Section 2919 
(,Code of 1887) adJ1ere<l to the prior decision in the Hill 
case. See pages 427-431 of the opinion, and made the inter-
esting observation on page 431 of the opinion that: 
"It is a mistake to suppose that the 8th section of CJ1n1>-
ter 168 of the Code of 1860 ( amended in the Code of l8W, 
Chapter 182, Section 8), was intended to create a lien against 
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the purchaser by docketing the judgment. The lien is crea.t6d 
by Section 6, and attaches to all of the real estate of the 
debtor except so far as is qualified by Section 8. The quaii-
fication is that it shall not extend to real estate aliened after 
judgments to purchasers for value who have no notice of the 
judg·ment unless the judgment be docketed in the manner and 
within the time prescribed. The implication is irresistible 
that if so docketed it shall be a lien; that is, that the lien 
which is created by Section 6 shall continue as to such pur-
chasers.'' 
Section 6, Chapter 186 of the Code of 1860, is now, with 
some modifications, Section 6470 of the Co~e of 19-36, and 
Section 8 of said Chapter of the Code of 1860, is now, with 
some modifications, Section 6471 of the Code of 1936. 
Fa.ddez!'s Adnir. v. Williams' .A.dmr., supra, decided Sep-
temper 29, 1898. The decison of the Lower Court under re-
view in this case was rendered January 15, 1898. Original 
Code Section 2919 of the Code of 1887,. as finally amendecl, 
as hereinbefore pointed out, continued as similar Code Sec-
tion in the s·ame form in the Code of 1904, down to the re-
codification of the Code of 1919, was in force and the effect 
thereof was construed and established in this case. 
21 * '!!'The facts of the case ·were as follows: 
At the March Term, 1860, of the County Court for Shenan-
doah County, one Mark Bird, suing for the use of P. Wil-
liams, recovered a judgment ag·ainst .Ely Fad~ley and Jacob 
Loutz, for the sum of $833.33-1/3 with interest thereon from 
May 10, 1854, and $7.56 costs. This judgment was docketed 
March 24, 1860, and execution was issued thereon on March 
21, 1860, returnable to May 7, 1860. Mark Bird, the nominal 
plaintiff, and P. Williams, the beneficial plaintiff in the judg-
ment, both died . 
.A scire facias was i~sued on March 20, 1890-29 years, 10 
months and 13 days, after the return day of the execution, 
seeking to revive the judgment. . The statute of limitations 
was relied upon as a defense to the scire facias. Counsel for 
the nominal and beneficial judgment creditors contended 
that: 
"There should be excluded, in· computing· the· time within 
which the scire facias could issue, one year from the· quali-
fication of a personal representative for the nominal p]ain. 
tiff, and also the beneficial plaintiff-making· two years-and 
also the period between January 1, 1869, and i\farch 29, 1871, 
and the stay law period, from April 17, 1861, to J a.nuary 1, 
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1869, thus making the entire period to be excluded 11 years, 
11 months and 20 days.'' 
Buchanan, J., delivered the opinion, and held that there 
was to be deducted from the time within which the sdre flicias 
was required to be sued out, the two periods relied upon 
under Code Section 2919, but held that the one-year period 
applied only from the death of the nominal plaintiff in the 
judgment, to-wit, :Mark Bird, and that the one year claimed 
froin the death of the beneficial plaintiff, P. Williams, could 
not be allowed because said Williams was ·not a party 
22* · of record. The *language of Judge Buchanan, page 
. 399 of the. opinion, here set forth for the convenience 
of this Honorable Court is as follows: 
"The period which elapsed between the return day of the 
execution ( on which there was a return by the sheriff show-
ing· that it had not been satisfied) and the suing out of the 
scire facias was 29 years, 10 months and 13 days. From this 
i~ to be deducted the time duriug- wllich the st,:1tnte of Hmi-
tations did not run as is provided in Section 2919 of the Code, 
as amended by Ac.ts of Assembly approved February 29, 1888 
( Acts 1887-8, pages 345-6). But in ascertaining that time 
the period of one year from the qualification of the persoJJ.al 
representative of the beneficial plaintiff in the judgment can-
not be included, as counsel for defendant in error insists. It 
is usual, when an action is brought in the name of one per-. 
son, for the benefit of another, to state that fact in the body 
of the declaration, or to endorse it thereon, or on the. writ. 
It is useful and convenient to do so to give notice to the de-
fendant of the rip;bts of the h<me:ficial plaintiff and to enable 
the Court to protect him by its order; but this is not neces-
sary. The statement. is no material part of the plead-
ings. The cause of action is complete without it, for he is 
~10t a party on the record." 
The decision of Judge Buclianan that the period of one 
year from the date of the death of the nominal judgment 
credit01~ as provided by Code Section 2919 (1887 Code) now 
Section 5809, was to be excluded from the time within which 
t.he scire .f acias was required to be sued out under then Code 
Section 8577; now Code Section 6477, is, we submit, determina-
tive of the question as to the exclusion of the period of one 
year from the date of the death oii, to-wit, November 23, 1934, 
·of Harley P. ,:\Tilson; assignee of record of tl1e .judgments 
erroneouslv held bv the Chancellor to be barred. 
A scire iacias is not a new suit, but a continuation of the 
\ 
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old suit, White v. Palm.er, 110 Va. 490; American Railway Ex-
p·ress Co. v. Royster Co., 141 Va. 602. So long as a writ 
" 23* *of scfre facias inay issue an equity suit may be filecl.. 
Flanary v. Ka.ne, su.pra, for the collection of the judg·. 
ment. A judgment creditor has no interest in the land o~ 
his judgment debtor, and hence, neither a writ of sci re f acias 
to revive a judgment, nor a proceeding in equity, to enforce 
the collection thereof, is a real action. The case of James' s 
Executor and -Others v. Life, supra., established the law in this 
jurisdiction to be that a judgment c~editor may proceed in 
equity against the personal representative of his decedent 
and his devisees and heirs at law to subject the real estate 
~ of the decedent to the payment of the judgment recovered 
.against him in his lifetime, without first reviving such judg-
ment at law, and that the right to file such a bill in equity is 
co-exten.si.ve as to time with the right to sue out an executio'IJ 
-0n sitch .1udgment. 
We submit that the opinion of Judge Buchanan in the ·1lade-
ley v. Williams case, siipra, standing alone, makes manifest 
the error in the decree complained of. In the opinion of the. 
Chancellor, as herein before pointed out, he inferentially ad-
mits that under the decision if appellants had been before 
him on writs of scire facias the statute of limitations would 
not have applied and said writs reviving said seven judgments 
would have had to issue. He erroneously limits this decision 
to writs of scire .facias although in the Jmnes's case, supra, 
it was affirmatively held in this jurisdiction that the right 
to file an equity proceeding, which the petition of appelllants 
is, is co-extensive as to time with the right to sue out an 
execution and by analog·y with the time to sue out a writ of 
scire facias, and in the case of Flanary v. Kane, supra, 
24~ it was held that so long *as the right to bring a scire 
f acias or action on a judgment exists the lien thereof 
may be enforced in equity. 
Upon the record· assignment of said judgments to Harley 
P. Wilson, and the provisions of Section 6471a of the Code 
of Virginia (Michie's 1936), he became the plaintiff in each 
of the judgn1ents. After sucli assignment the only party who 
could have enforced tlie said judgments during the lifetime 
of the said Harley P. Wilson was the said Harley P. Wilson, 
assignee thereof, and upon his death the only_ parties who 
could enforce the collection thereof are his executor and execu-
trix. The manifest purpose of the Legislature in retaining 
the concluding· parag-raph of Code Section 2919 (Code of 
1887), as present Code Section 5809 of the 1936 Code, was., to 
JJrotect the rights of a decedent by providing that the period 
of one year from the date of the death of a decedent, should -
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be excluded in the computation of time within which, by the 
operation oj any statute, or rule of law, it would be otherwise 
necessary to commence any proceeding to preserve or pre- , 
vent the loss of a.ny right or remedy which he had or to which 
he was entitled. The langua~e of the legislature is too plain 
to admit of any misapplicat10n and too plain to invite any 
refined rules of construction. Such period of time to be ex-
cluded applied to any proceeding, either writs of fieri facias,. 
writs of scfre facias, actions of debt on the judg·ment, or equity 
proceedings to enforce the payment of judgments. 
Steffey v. King, supra. This is the case upon which the 
Chancellor apparently founds his decree, and for that 
25* reason *we will review it somewhat at length. The opin-
ion was rendered by Kelly, J., and the facts and equities 
were so preponderingly in favor of the appellant, as to elicit 
the observation from that humane jurist that ''.Such a case 
as the one at bar has perhaps never before arisen''. 
The facts were that one Thomas L. Kasev died testate in 
the year 1889, seised of certain real and personal estate which 
he· devised to his wife, Sarah E. Kasey, with the proviso that 
if at his wife's death anything 'Should remain over ''It is 
my will and desire that Bessie H. Foster, a girl that I have 
raised, have all the personal property and real estate to have-
and to hold forever". Under the law at the date the will 
became effective the widow took an absolute fee simple and 
the attempted devise and bequest over to Bessi~ H. Foster. 
testator's niece, was void. Upon the death of testator, his 
\\-ridow and devisee took possession of the property so de-
vised, the said Bessie H. Foster continuing to live 'with her 
until the death of the widow on the 24th day of January, 
1907. Thereupon the said Bessie H. Foster took possei;;sion 
of said real estate, '' Claiming and treating it as her own, 
and her right and title thereto was never questioned by any-
body until this suit was broup;ht in 1917' \ In January, 1908, 
she married one John H. Riggle and she and her husband 
having decided to move to Tennessee, they advertised and 
fiold at public auction all of the real estate on the 22nd day 
of February, 1908. The sale was ~idely advertised, was 
largely attended, ".And the parties: or certainly most of 
26* the·m who are now clainiing ad1Jersely to the *title ac-
quired at that sale, knew all abou,t it, and never o·nr.e 
ch.al.len.ged Us validity u.ntil they did so by the litil}ation ·in 
,which this appeal was granted". One of the parcels of the 
land so sold was purchased by the appellant Steffey, who 
immediately entered into possession thereof and admittedly 
held the same continuously with all tl1e elements of adverse 
possession from the date of his purchase. 
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In May, 1917, more than ten years after the death of 'Mrs. 
Kasey and more than ten years after Bessie H. Foster had 
entered into possession of the real estate which had con-
tinued uninterruptedly ever since in her and her alienees, 
the heirs at law of Mrs. Kasey filed their bill in equity against 
the purchasers at such sale, including the appellant Steffey, 
"Claimin_q title the1·eto~ and praying the rJo·urt to re1no1,e the 
cloud thereon} which they alleged e:msted by reason of the 
deed executed by the said Bessie Rigg·les and her husband, 
on the ground that under tbe will "Mrs. Kasey took fee sim-
ple title to the real estate and that the attempted remainder 
over to Bessie H. Foster was void for uncertainty". 
It will be noted that the cause of action assM·ted was a 
real action, to try the title to real estate and recover the pos-
session thereof, and not a personal action. In the suit at bar, 
the actions of appellants are personal actions. 
The major defense interposed in the lower Court was that 
the suit was barred by the statute of limitations, to-wit, ad-
verse possession. Complainants contended that '' the pe-
riod of one year from the death of Sarah E. Kasey should 
be excluded from the period of possession claimed by 
27* the defendant''. The *lower Court sustained this con-
tention and entered a decree in favor of complainants, 
which was reversed--except as to certain inf ants whose rights 
were saved by the statute of disahility---on the appeal. 
Judge Kelly based his derision on two grounds: 
:B,irst, that the one-year provision of Section 2919, now 
5809, of. the Code does not apply" to real actions. 
Second, that said section did not apply because Mrs. Kasey, 
at the date of her cfoatl1, did not die possessed of a.ny rigllt 
designed to be protected by said section. 
The discussion of the first ground by Judge Kelly will he 
found, beginning in t.hc second paragraph, ( 4), page 125 of 
tl1e opinion and running throug·h pag·cs 126, 127 and the first 
paragraph of page 128. 
Code Section 191.9 then P-mbraced the stay law provisions 
and as its concluding- paragraph present Code Section 5809. 
~rhe stay law provisions of this section had been held to ap-
ply to an action of ejectment by this Honorable Court in the 
prior case of Virginia Mini11.g a.nd Improvement Co. v. Hoo·ver, 
82 Va. 449. Judge Kelly does not overrule this· decision. 
He states· ·on the contrary that there was plausible, if not 
~onvincing reason for the decision, and that the stay law pro-
visions on which the decision of that case rested-part and 
parcel of the then statute including· likewise the one-year 
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provision-would '' seem, to apply no less to actions of ej~ct-
rnent than to those relating to personal or pecuniary causes''. 
In short, Judge Kelly says, in respect to one complete statute, 
part thereof invoked and held by t}lis Honorable Court to ap-
ply in an action of ejectmgn.t applie§ q,like tq personal 
28* and real actions, and tl!~t the *conoluding1 pal'f the11e9f, 
applied only to pers011al actions, in effect tearing in 
two parts one complete ~nd continuous statute, holding one 
part thereof to apply to real and versonal actions, and one 
part solely to P.ersgn~l actions. 
Although, a~ stated, such decision does nQt 3:ffect the rights 
of appella~ts who are invoking the proyisions of Section 5809 
in persan<;1,l aQtions-not real ~ctions=we subP1it with the 
grea;test def<m~nc~ that such constmction of th.e. l~n~age of 
J"udge l{flllyJ not only violates the carginal rul~s QI itatutory 
construction, but that it w~s not necessary to a. decision of 
the case then before him, and to that e~tent is obiter. In 
such thought we a~e su~:norted by ~Ii:~ language of Judge 
Kelly, himself, who in man if est recognition that such con-
struction of his expre~sion that said section -applies onlv to 
personal action was obiter·, and of doubtful soundness, pro-
ceeded to decide the case on the second ground,-the only 
point necessary to be determined-and states: 
'' There is another and perhaps a strongr ground upon 
which to hold the amendment ( now Code Se~tion 5809), does 
not apply to the instant case, and this groitnd is equally ,q,w~ 
1wheth,w the amendment applies to real actions or- not.'~ 
- This ground will be found discussed, beginning in the sec.-
ond paragraph (5) on page 128 of the opinion, and in the 
language of Judge Kelly, is stated as follows: 
''When the legislature provided for the exclusion of 'one 
year from the death of any party', it of course meant sorne 
partv havin.Q a right and cau.se of action .. This right 1'11-'tt:rt 
have existed, or at least have been capable of coming into. 
existence du!in,q the life of. the party. Under the pecu.liar· 
and u,1niqiee facts of this case Mrs. Kasey was not S'ltch 
29• a person. Iler possession and her right *of control u,ere 
not questioned or invaded, and would not have been 
questioned or invaded so long as she lived.'' 
Judge Ke11y was on firm g-round in this construction of the 
statute, and the decision of the case, we respectfully submit, 
was not that Section 5809 of the Code did not apply because. 
it does not embrace real aotions, but that it did not apply be-i 
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cause Mrs. Kasey did not die with any right of action in ex-
istence, the condition vreclident t.o the application of said.sec .. 
tion. 
r~is ~onstructi9n pf the tru~ ;meaning 9f the il~cisi-On is 
s-µ.pp9;rt~d PY Judge l(elly him~lf1 ,as .b~ .said in the di.11J,:ms-
sj9n pf said ".strong~r ground'·' that .had .Mrs .. K~sey b~en 
9jst111.bea in her rignt and po~ession prior to .her death-.and 
<nfA.cl without hav~g her right determine~(thus leaving ex-
isti.i;tg :the condition pi-e~ed~.nt tp the applieati<m of the sec-
ti®1 that said section ".miu.li.t have applied:,' .. 
As appellants are se~_king tg .enforce "pecir,ruary ,or per-
.. ~onal actions'', th~ qy~$tion. .oJ. the correetness of Judge Kel-
]y 's opinion that pre.~imt C.od~ Section I>·809 does not apply 
to real actions, is~ moot .one, in ~o f:ar .ai ·the suit at bar is con-
cerned. As a purely J:tbsir.act p;r .. opo.$iti.on, however, we sub· 
mit, as stated, with the gre.ate2.t il.~fer~n.ce, that Judge Kelly~s 
la.n~Q,ge in holding· s.aid .s.ecti~n to apply spl~lv to personal 
.a.ctions and not to real ~tfon.s, is obit.er,11ot necessary to the 
decision of the case in which ~ne;h lang'Jfflge was used, that 
said section is a general rule of law, and by its plain intend-
rnent applies alike in. this jurisdiction :to rt.at {1!nd personal 
actions. - . 
30~ *The accepted definition 9f res11 .a~t1PJls i.n the host of 
.authorities is.: 
<'Real actions ft'J.'C those broug;ht for the specifie recovery 
of lands, tenements 01:· hereditaments. The e.s~ential and dis-
tinguishing fact that gives an action the c11aracter of a real 
.action is that it .~eeks to -re.eov(w sper.iffoa1ly the land and its 
poss(3ssion. '' 4 '.Min. Inst. 83'9'; Vol 23, Am. & Eng. Eucye., 
SP.<Jond Ed., 892 ; 33 Oy.c. 15.42 : Burks Pleading and Practice, 
Third :Eel.. '140. suprn., , 
Similnrly personal act.ions a.Ye defined as f.o11ows: 
'' Actions for the· specific 1.'ecovery of goods and chattels 
and for the recovery of money, whether debt or damages and 
other injurie~ of every description excepting onl11 the specific 
recoven1 of t-itle or vos.~ession of lands, tene-rnents or heredi-
taments. ''. 1 Cyc. 731; Burks Pleading and Practice, 140, 
l:;,t1,pra. 
Likewise: 
"An action of debt is always the proper and, in most cases; 
the exclusive remedy, when n.n action is desired to be brought 
on a judgment. But, of course, the remedy by motion may 
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no~ be resorted to." Code 6046; Burks Pleading and Prac-
tice,. s1,1,pra,. 151. 
And successive equity suits may be brought until full pay-
ment of the judgment is had. .Kelly v. llamblen, 98 Va. 383. 
Under the decisiom.; of this Honorable Court,. hereinbefore-
cited, a judgment c1·edit.or has no interest in the land of his 
debtor and no right to the posse~sion thereof, and hence a 
proceeding in equity to enforce the judgment lien is not a. 
real action, as the element of s-.eeking to recover specifically 
land and its possession, the essential and disting~ishing fac-
tor establishing the character of an action as a real action is 
absent. The light arising under the judgment is a pe-
31 * cuniary or *personal right. 'fhe right of Hs enforce-
ment surviveR upon tl1e death of the judgment. creditor· 
to his per.cw12al representa.tfoc, not to his heirs a.t law. An 
equity proceeding· to enforce the lien is none the less a per-
sonal action within the definition and classification of ae-
tions, although by necessity such method of procedure may 
become in cbaractel' qu,asi in rem. Adoption of such methocl 
to enforce the right does not destroy the character of the 
action and convert it into a real action. 
Harper, et a.l., v. Harper, et al., supra, page 216 of the 
opinion. This was a general creditors' suit in a Court of 
equity. As in the snit at bar it was filed by creditors of a 
decedent against the administrator and heirs at law of the-
decedent. 
The facts were that by deed dated May 21, 1907, one E .. 
Howard Harper conveved certain real estate to his father 
and mother for their lives, and upon the death of either to 
the sur\Tivor dming· his or her life., ,md upon the death of 
the surviving parent to revert to the g-rantor. In the deed 
said Harper agreed to pay to his seven sisters, upon the 
death of his father, the sum of $200.00 each and in the lan-
guage of the deed the amonnts so agTeod to be paid were made 
a lien and charge on the land thereby conveyed. Grantor's 
father died on August 22, 191.lt and upon his death, the pay-
ment of the said sum of $200.00 to each of gra.ntor 's seven 
sisterH beeame dne. Grantor's mother snrvived Jiis father 
and died on February 18, 1920, at which time the land re-
verted to the grimt.or, E. Howard Harper~ who died Decem-
ber 21, 19·27, without having disposed of the land either by 
deed or by will, and at which time and for year8 before he 
had been a resident of West Vir2':inia. Shortlv after his 
3·2-.,, death. the suit WaR *filed by Six '"of his surviving sisters 
and the administrator of the deceased sister against 
L. C. Barley, et als., v. ,J.M. Duncan, Jr., .Adm'r, etc. 23 
his administrator and heirs at law to subject the Janel to the 
payment of said sums and of the said lien thereon charged. 
Pleas of the statute of limitations were filed to said claims. 
The cause was referred to a Commissioner for report, who, 
after taking depositions, filed his report which was confirmed 
by the Lower Court. 
In addition to the lien debts of record, one J. D. Harper 
appeared before the Commh;sioner and filed with him an in-
terest bearing note elated March 15, 1923, executed by the 
decedent, E. Howard Harper, payable mm day after date in 
the sum of $9,000.00, with interest. 
The administrator of the deceased maker of the note, E. 
Howard Harper, filed the plea of the five year statute of 
limitations thereto. The Commissioner and the Lower Court 
rejected the plea, and allowed the note, amounting, principal 
and interest, to the sum of $13,132.50, as a claim against the 
estate of the decedent1 E. Howard Harper. 'This holding of 
the Lower Court was affirmed on the appeal. The note in 
question became due and payable l\farch 16, 1923. Suit was 
instituted May 5, 1928, but the maker of the note died on 
December 21, 1927. It was he]d and affirmed on appeal tl1at, 
by reason of the death of the maker of said note, under Sec-
tion 5809 of t]1e Code, one year from the date of his death 
was to be eliminated in the computation of the time and that 
when said year was excluded, the note was not barred and 
that the plea of the statute of limitations was not applicable. 
In affirming· the decision of the Lower Court, Gregory, J., 
page 216 of the opinion, states: 
33* *'' Code 5809 provides that 'the period of one year 
from the death of any party shall be excluded from the 
computation of time within wllich, by the operation of any 
statute or rule of law, it may be necessary to commen~e any 
proceeding to preserve or prevent tl1e loss of any right or 
remedy'; and Code Section 5826-a provides that 'when a 
suit in chancery is commenced as a general creditors' suit, 
the running· of the statute of limitations sl1all be suspended 
as to debts provable in such snit from the commenrement 
of the same, provided they are brought in befor~ the master 
under the first reference for an account of debts.' These 
two section:,; are applicable and clearly prevent the bar of tl1e 
five-year statute of limitations invoked.'' 
It is to be borne in mind that under the provisionR of then 
Code Sections 2557, 2665 and 2667. now Sections 5~73, 5395 
·and 5397 of th~ Code of 1936, the said Harper had a statutorJJ 
lien on the real estate an~ personal property of the decedent 
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ju~t as appellants in the instant suit have statiitory Z-ien.~ by 
virtue of their judgments on the real estate of the decedent 
under the pro·v'isions of present Code Section 6470. 
In holding that Section 5810 of our Code titled '' Limitation 
of PerRonal Actions Generally'' and Section 5818 of our Code 
beginning "Every Personal Action" did not apply to the fur-
·ther plea of the stat.ute of limitations interposed by the· heirs· 
to the lien debt because they related solely to personal ac-
tions, Judge Gregory states: 
. . 
'' The case here is one in which a. lien is sought to be en-
forced in a chancery suit against the land. It certainly is 
not a personal action." 
The true ground for rejecting the two pleas, as we con-
strue the decision is not that the two Code sections invoked 
could not be· relied upon because the case was "certainly not 
a personal action' '·--but that the eqititable lien thereby sought 
to be enforced was not barred for a period of tweniy 
34* years. The :!(·right to enforce the lien accrued on Au-
gust 22nd., 1911., nnd the ~mit to enforce same was in-
stituted in May, 1928, leRs than twenty years before the same 
would have become barred under the only limitation appli-
cable. 
Such construction as to the true reason for the re,jection 
of the pleas, is, w~ suhmit, supported by the language of the 
opinion, page_ 219. 
"There is a very marked distinction between an action 
at law to recover judgment for a legal demand and a pro-
ceeding in equity to enforce an equitable lien for the same 
demand. The remed~1 at law may be barred bJJ the statute 
of limitations, but the stnhtte o.f limitations does not ea;f:iri-
giiish the debt, and a l·ien therefor may be enforced in equity, 
although the d,~bt be barred." 
"The autho1ities cited and the quotations tl1ercfrom con-
clitsivel11 demonstrate that the lien here asserted is an equi-
table lien &nd in no way affected or barred by any of flu: vati-
ous statutes of limitations invoked." 
The language that an equity proceeding·s to enforce an 
equitable lien is certninly not a personal action: under the 
-familiar rules of construction of decisions is to be read in 
the li~ht of the facts in the case then under consideration. 
Had the proceedings to recover the $200.00 claims asserted 
been on the law side of the Court., the two statutes invoked 
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:would .have applied, because .~aid claims were barred at .UJIW. 
Under the facts a.nd pleadings in the equity suit filed, how-
.ever, the two statutes invoked constituted no bar, not becoose 
an: equity proceedings to en.forqe a·n eqititable lien is "'Cer-
tainly 'Jtot a personal action,'' but becav.se said statutes did 
~ot apply to the collection in equity of an equitable lien. whicl,1, 
under the pertinent l-im:itation wa..~ not barred in equity for. a 
period of twenty years. . 
.35,i *Vve are appreciative of ti1e fact that the expression 
by Judge Gregory that a proceeding in equity to en-
force an equitable lien, (not a statutory lien as appellants 
.are seeking to enforce in the suit at bar) "Certainly is not 
.a personal action'' may be argued in opposition to our posi-
tion that the effort of appellants to enforce in this suit legal 
liens on pecuniary M versonal actions, is certainly not a. real 
.action. We do not believe that Judge Gregory, hy such 
parenthetic language intended to state the law in this juris-
diction to be that an equity proceedings to enforce legal liens 
is a real cause of act.ion. If, · however, it be considered that 
Judge Gregory intended to so state, then it follows that bav- . 
ing held that Section 5809 app1ied to. the right of J. D. Har-
per to collect his note, for the payment of which he· had a 
statutory lien on the real estate and personal property of 
the deceased maker, by such expression Judge Gregory per-
force, likewise held that said section applies to real actions, 
and overrules the ohiter by .Judge Kelly in the Steffey v. King 
case, sitpra, that it did not apply to rea] actions ~nd held that 
such section now applies alike to both real and pecuniary o·r 
personal actions. · 
The Fadeley case, su,pra, held that the then period of one 
year from the date of the qualification of a personal repre-
sentative of a judgment creditor-was to be exc1uded from 
the computation of time in -which. an action of scire facias 
must be instituted on a judgment. The Harper case, supra, 
held that the period of one year from -the date of the death of 
a debtor must be excluded in the computation of time within 
which an action must be brought on a claim, protected 
36• by a statutorv lien, *in an equity suit: there stated not 
to be q personal act-ion. These two decisions, we sub-
mit, establish heyond peradventure that one year from the 
date of the death of Harley P. Wilson, to-wit, one year from 
the 23rd day of No,remher, 1934, and the additional period of 
one year from the date of the death of .James M. Duncan, Sr., 
jud~ment debtor, to-wit, one year from t]u:l. 17th day of .Juno, 
1936, are to be excluded in the computation of the ten year 
period of limitation fixed for the enforcement of the judg-
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ments in question under the provisions of Section 6477 or 
.our Code. 
In conclusion of this assignment we rei,pectfnlly submit: 
a: That the enforcement of a judgment is a personal right 
and that proceedings in equity for such purpose-although 
quasi in rem, is not a real action. 
b: That the filing of this suit on the 26th day of June,. 
1939, immediately suspended the operation of the limitation 
prescribed by Code Section 6477 for the enforcement of the 
judgments held by appellants against James :M. Duncan, Sr., 
intestate, deceased. 
c: That Code Section 5S09 is manifestlv intended by the 
legislature to be a general rule of lav\1 and a general !i~ita-
tion, applicable alike to personal actions and real action, aud 
by its very terms stops the rnnning· of any applica b]e statute 
of limitations in the event of the d~ath of any interested 
party with a right vested as of the date of such death ancl 
which right survives the death of such party. 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR ONE AND 'rWO. 
These assignments are determined by identic equity prin-
ciples and will be considerec:l jointly. 
As to the deed of trust referred to in the first assignment 
of error, the language of the Commissioner in report.-
37• in~ in •respect thereto, here set forth in full for the 
conveniences of. this Honorable Court, (Trs., p. 35), is: 
"(b) el. M. Duncan and 'Mnry V. Duncan, his wife, to C. C. 
Carlin, Jr., Trustee, dnterl October 12, 1928, recorded in 
Liber Eye, No. 10, page 454 Y2, among· the land records of 
Fairfax County, Virgii:iia, seeming the payment of a negoti-
able, promissory note of even date therewith, for the sum 
of $800.00, executed by said J. M. Duncan and Mary V. C. 
Duncan, payable to themselves or 01·der on or before one 
year after date at the First National Bank, Alexandria., Vir-
ginia, with interest at 6% per annum, from date, until paid. 
Two similar interest notes for $24.00 each, evidencing- the 
first yea.r's interest on said principal note, are also secured 
hv this trust deed. 
· "This deed of trust constitutes a lien on all of parcel .A. 
above described. 
"The holder of this note is 1iot known. Nor is it knoi1./n• 
whether a'vny vayrnent has been made thereon. C. C. Ca.rlin; 
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.Tr., Trustee, is a party defendant to thjs suit and John W. 
Tulloch, one of his Committee, appeared at the hearing- be-
fore your Commissioner. The curator of the estate of C. C. 
Carlin, Sr., deceased, also appeared before your Commis-
sioner and testiffod that he would try to find the note, if owned, 
by the estate of C. C. Carlin, 8r., and ascertain the bala1we 
due thereon.'' (Italics om·s.) 
.As to the failure of the Commissioner to de:finite]y report 
as to the ownership of the lots referred to in the second as 4 
signment of error, the lang:uag-e of his report, now set forth 
in full for the convenie11ce of this Honorable Court ( Trs., p. 
43). is: · 
'' .As to Parcel B, supra : By deed recorded in Libe-r B, No. 
8, page 579, "\Vashington Potomac Industrial Corporation con-
veyed to one Smoot Lots 3-54, Block 41; By deed recorded 
in Liber B, No. 8, page 580 it conveyed to one Daniel Lots 
4-53, Block 41 and by deed recorded in Liber C. No. 8, page 
8, it conveyed to one Du'b:mt Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5-54, Lot 36, 
all in the Subdivision known as Alfred Hig·hbie 's Addition 
''B"-Yernon on the Potomac. J.: our Commissioner cannot 
definitely report whether or not the <lescriptio1i in these deeds 
were nf individital lots or were intended to be inclusive. 
In describing in Parcel B! sitpra, the lots in Block 36 anrl 
41 nf said Su,bd-ivision as owned by J a1nes U. Dimca·n,, Sr.,. 
at fhP. tim.e of his death, wmr C(lm:niissioner has necessa,rily 
taken the position thn.t the description contained in said, 
deed.~ tn Sm.not, Daniel an(l Dubant, cover only individual 
lots. 
38* *'' If JJowr Corn.1ni.iu?ioner shoitld be wron.Q in this and 
said deeds were meant tn be inclusive in their respec-
tive description . .::: of thP- lots thereby conveyed, Jmnes NI. Dun-
cn.n. Sr .. did not own, at the tinie of his dea,th, the lots itJii 
Blocks .~6 n.nd 4l of said 8ubdivisfon, above described i11. 
Parcel R. ,, 
The ]auguage of the Commissioner in respect to the said 
deed of trust and the owners11ip of said lots speaks for itself. 
In effect he Pays that he is unable to report whether or not 
the $800.00 is a lien on Lots 1-20, inclusive, in B1o~k 34; 
Lots 1-12, inc]usive, 25, 26, 27, Block 37; and Lots 1-33, in~ 
elusive. Block 40. of the tract of land described al:? ParcPl A, 
a part of the real estate situated in Fairfax County, ha~ 
been paid, either in whole or in pnrt, or constitutes a lien 
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thereon, in whole or in part. In respect to the lots in High-
bie 's Addition reported as Parcel D of the real estate situated 
in Fairfax County, Virginia, he in effect states that said 
lots may be or rnau not be owned by said decedent. Certainly 
the status of the alleged cleed of trust respecting- the bene-
ficial holder tl1ereof, the amount, if any, due thereunder, anrl 
the ownership of and title to said lots in Highbie 's Addition 
are matters possible of definite judicial ascertainment, which, 
we J'espectfully E,Ubmit, should have been had be.fore the de-
cree of sale was entered. 
When there are various liens on the land of a debtor, it is 
premature and erroneous to decree a sale of said land with-
out first definitely ascertaining the full extent of all tl1e 
real estate owned by sueh debtor and definitely establishing 
all the liens binding thereon ancl fixing their respective 
amounts and priorities. There is no bc1tter settled rule 
39"' *of equity practiee in this jurisdiction and extended 
citation of authorities in support thereof is not deemecl 
necessary. Sh-1,1,ltz, et al. v. Flansbrmi.gh, et al .. , 74 Ya. 567, 
_ · pages 577-8-9-80 of the opinion; BrLstol Iron, etc., Co. v. 
Caldwell. 95 Va. 47; Kirby v. Booke1·: 122 Va. 291; and Stein-
man v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 121 Va. 611, page 640 of the 
opinion. 
"\V'ithout i:.ueb definite ascertainment of the real estate and 
of the liens and priorities binding thereon, no judgment 
creditor and no other party in interest can intelligently bid at 
a judicial sale to protect his or her rig·hts. 
We submit that the Chancellor erred in decreeing that the 
said seven jucl~ments are barred; that said judgments, in 
their proper order -of priority, constitute valid ancl subsist-
ing liens upon the real estate owned by the judgment debtor, 
as of the dates said judgments were obtained, and upon any 
additional real estate of which he died seised and possessed 
and thu.t the Chancellor should have confirmed the exceptions 
of a.ppellants to the 1~port. of the Commissioner, respecting 
said judgments, and should have entered a decree e!dablish-
ing the said judgments as such valid and subsisting liens and 
charging the real estate of the judgment debtor with the 
payment thereof. That the decrPe of the Chancellor appoint-
ing Commissioners of sale and decreeing sale of the r{)al es-
tate in the hill and proeeedh1g:s mentioned, without first 
defi.nitelv ascerhlinin2' the status of tl1e deed of trust and the 
ownersh.ip of the re'al estate, discussed in assignments of 
error numbered Two and Three, · was prematurely entered 
and likewise erroneom~ in tliese respects. 
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True copies of this petition were delivereq to Messrs. 
40• *Thomas, Baekus and Strauss, .Albert V. Bryan, Raw-
dolph F. Da.vis and Judge Robinson Moncure, counsel 
for adverse parties, on the 26th day of March, 1940, and re-
ceipt of such copies by said adverse counsel is acknowledged 
hereon. This petition and the transcript of the record will 
.be filed with 'one of the Justices of the Supreme Court of 
'.Appeals of Virginia, at Richmond, Virginia. Not.ice is here-
by given that counsel for petitioners desire to state orally the 
reason for granting an appeal and ,r;'u.persedeas to the decree 
herein complained of and that they will adopt this petition as 
their opening brief on behalf of petitioners. 
For the errors assigned petitioners respectfully pray tha.t 
they may be awarded an appeal and supersedeas from .the 
said decree; that this Honorable Court may review the rulings 
.and decision of the ·chancellor in the Lower Court; that the 
decree complained of may be reviewed and reversed and such 
decree be entered as ma.y be necessary and proper to correct 
the errors complained of; and that th~y may have such other, 
further and complete relief as the nature· of their case may 
require and as to equity may seem meet. 
And as in duty bound, petitioners will ever pray, etc. 
LOUIS C. BARL11Y and 
MARGARET E. TRUCKENMILLER 
(formerly l\fargaret E. Deike), Exe .. 
cutor and Executrh: under the last 
·will and testament and codicils there-
to appended of the late Ha.r]ey P. 
Wilson, petitioners, 
By R. R. F'.ARR, 
WILSON M. FARR, 
Their counsel. 
4P' *\Ve. Richard R. F.,arr and Wilson M. Farr. Attor-
neys at law pra.ctieing in the Supreme Court of Appeals 
of Virginia, address, Fairf~x, Virginia, do hereby certify 
that in orrr opinion. the decree fmtered by the Corporation 
Court of the City of Alexandria, Virginia, _on the 1st day of 
February, 1940, comp]aim~d of in the above petition, is er-
roneous and should be reviewed and reversed by the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Yirgini.n 
RICHARD R. FAR.R, 
WILSON M. FARR, 
1\.ttorneys at Law. 
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We acknowledge receipt of a copy of the foreg_oing petition 
and brief, this 26th day of Ma l·ch, 1940 .. 
THOMAS, STRA.USS AND BACKUS, 
By: FR.ANKLIN P. BACKUS, 
J. RANDOLPH F. DA VIS, 
Atty. for Posey~ Cox & Keene .. 
ALBER,T V. BHY AN, 
ROBINSON MONCURE .. 
Received ~.!arch 27, 1940. 
M. R WATTS, Clerk .. 
April 12, 1940. .Appeal and .cmpersecleas awarded by the 
court. No bond. 
M.B. W. 
RECORD 
In the Corporation Court of the City of Alexandria, Virginia .. 
G. B. Wallace and George W. Herring, co-partners, trading 
and doing business as ,vallace and Herring, Complainants, 
1.' • 
• TameH M. Duncan, Jr., .Administrator of the estate of lames 
M. Duncan, Sr., deceased, Mary V. Duncan, widow, James 
M. Duncan, Jr., and Ruth B. Duncan, his wife, Ebner R .. 
Duncan and Dorothy R. Duncan, his wife; S. Guy Duncan 
and Mildred Dunca.n, his wife; Virginia D. Smith and 
Harry Lee Smitl11 her husband; Robert L. H. D?mcan,. 
single; and ,Julia Duncan, single; and all persons who are 
or may be interested in the ~uhject matter to be disposed 
of whose names are unknown, and who are made parties 
defendant by the general description of "parties unknown", 
and Mary L. :!\fcCandlish, Executrix of the }]st.ate of F. S .. 
McCandlish, Trustee, deceased, Defendants. 
IN nH.ANCERY NO. fiR69. 
BILL OF COMPLAINT. 
Filed .Tnly 19~ 19:39. 
To the Honorable ·wmiam P. ,voolls, ,Judge of said Court: 
Your Complainants, G. B. ,vanace and George ,v. Herring, 
L. C. Barley, et als., v. ,T. M: Duncan, Jr., .Adm 'r, etc. 31 
C?-partners, trading and doing business as Wallace and Her-
rmg., respectfully represents unto the Court as follow8: 
1. That on the 15th day of December1 1933, they recovered 
a judgment against ,lames M. Duncan, Sr., in the Civil and 
Police Justice's Court of the City of A.lexandria1 Virginia, 
in the sum of $445.38 with interest thereon from December 
1, 1933, until paid, together with costs therein expended, which 
. judgment is duly docketed in the Clerk's office of 
page 2 ~ Alexandria, Virginia, in .J udg-ment Lien Docket No. 
3, page 134, and a eopy of said judgment duly 
docketed in the Clerk's office of F1airfax County, Virginia, in· 
.Tudgment Lien Docket No. 12, page 123, and an abstract of 
which judgment is hereto attached marked "Exhibit A" and 
made a part of this Bil! of Complaint. 
2. That a writ of fiere facias was issued upon said judg-
ment on the first day of December, 193B, directed to the Ser-
geant of the City of Alexandria) Virginia, and which execu-
tion was returned to said Court with tl1e following return: 
''Nothing found upon whic.h to levy this writ this 4th day 
of Dec. 1933. 
R. H. COX. Sg:t .• 
By CLAUDE ,v. FLETCHER, 
Dep. Sgt.'' 
3. That on or a bout tbe 17th dny of ,Tune, 1936~ the said 
.Tames l\L Duncan, Sr., died intestate in the City of Alexan-
dria. Virginia, leaving the fol1owing nmped persons as his 
sole heirs at la,v, to-wit: ~:fary V. Duncan: his widow, .James 
M. Duncan, Ebner R. Duncan, S. Guy Duncan, Virginia D. 
Smith. Robert L. H. Duncan and Julia Duncan. 
4. That on the 28th day of June, 1937, Jam.es M. Duncan, 
.Tr., was nppointed by the Corporation Court of Alexandria 
City. Virginia, administrator of the estate· of James :M. Dun-
can, Sr., deceased, and qualified on said date by giving bond 
in the sum of $1,000.00 with proper surety. 
5. That your Complainant is one of several creditors of 
said J a.mes M. Duncan, Sr., during his lifetime, and having 
reduced their claim to judirment as heretofore set forth be-
came a judgment creditor of the same James M. Duncan, Sr., 
deceasecl, and hy virtue of said judgment, have 
page 3 ~ therefore, a lien upon the real estate> with the im-
provements thereon, located in tl1e City of Alexan-
dria, Virginia, and County of Fairfax, Virginia, of which the 
said tl ames :M. Duncan, Sr., died seised and possessed, and 
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which real estate is more particularly bounded and described 
as follows, to-wit: 
Parcel No. 1. A11 of that lot or parr.el of ground located on 
the South side of Prince Street between Patrick and Alfred 
Streets, in the City of Alexandria, and bounded and described 
as follows, to-wit: 
:Reginning on the south side of Prince Street, fifty feet 
(60), more or less, east of Patrick Street, and at a point five. 
feet (5) east of the ea.st wall of the brick dwelling lately owned 
and occupied by Mrs. E. B. Hooff; and running thence east 
on Prince Street twenty-one feet (21), four inches (4); thence 
south and p~.ra.llel to Patrick Street, eighty-eight feet (88), 
.more or less, to an alley twenty feet ( 20) wide, leading into 
Patrick Street: thence wesf on saidaUey twenty-one feet (21), 
four inches ( 4) ; and thence north and parallel to Patrick 
Street, and in a direct line ei.ghty-eight feet (88), more or less 
to the beginning, with right of way over said alley in common 
with others entitled thereto, and all rig·hti,, and appurtenances 
to the sflid lot belonging·. 
Parcel No. 2: 52.051 acres, more or less, situated in Falls 
Church Magisterial District, Fairfax County, Virginia. 
Parcel No. 3: 12.588 acres, more or less, situated in Mount 
Vernon Magisterial District, Fairfax County, Virginia. 
6. That by deed of trust dated September 29, 1927, and duly 
recorded in Liber C No. 10, page 287, one of the 
page 4 ~ land records of Fairfax County, Virginia., James M. 
Duncan, Sr., and wife conveyed unto F. S. McCa.nd-
lish. Trustee, in trust to secure ciertain lots in the Subdivi-
sion of "v\Teyanoke", which subdivision is a part of Parcel 
No. 2 heretofore referred to, in trust to secure the sum of 
$1,650.00, evidenced by one note, payable three years after 
date. all of which is more particularly set forth and described 
in said Deed of tmst and to which trust reference is hereby 
ma.de for further description of the property therein con-
tained. That since the date of the execution Qf said trust, 
the Trustee, F. S. McCandlish, died, testate, naming- his widow, 
Mary L. McCandJish as executrix of his last will and testa-
ment and that said executrix duly qualified in the Circuit 
Court of :F''airfax County, Virginia, out of which court letters 
testamentary have been issued. 
7. That the property heretofore described is not suscep-
tible to partition in kind and your Complainant believes that 
it is t.o the best interests of nll parties coneern6d that the 
said property be sold and tl1e proceeds of said sale divided 
among the parties entitled· thereto after the lien debts on 
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the real estate heretofore described have been paid, includ-
ing the lien of your Complainant. 
IN TENDER CONSIDERATION whereof and forasmuch 
as your Complainant is remediless in the premises save in 
a court of equity where matters of this kind are alone cog-
nizable, your Complainant prays that the said James l\L Dun-
can, Jr., Administrator of the estate of .James M. Duncan, 
Sr., deceased; :Mary V. Dunr..an, widow, James M. Duncan, 
Jr., and Ruth B. Duncan, his wife, Ebner R. Duncan and 
Dorothy R. Duncan, his wife; S. Guy Duncan and 
page 5 ~ Mildred Duncan, his wife; Virginia D. Smith and 
. Harry Lee Smith," her husband; Robert L. H. Dun-
can, single; and Julia Duncan, sing·le ; and Mary L. Mc'Cand-
lish, Executrix of the estate of F. S. McCandlish, Trustee, 
deceased; and an persons who are or may be interested in .the 
subject matter to be disposed of wl10se names are unknown, 
and who are made parties defendant by the general descrip-
tion of '~parties unknown", may be made :eart.ies defendant 
to this Bill of Complaint and be required to answer the same, 
hut not under oath, answer under oath being hereby expressly 
waived; that all proper orders and dec.rees may be made, 
inquiries be directed and accounts taken; that if it shall ap-
pear that the rents and profits from the said estates hereto-
fore described will not satisfy said judgment and other liens 
in five years, then the real estate and improvements thereon 
heretofore ilr.-scrihed he Rold and the profit therefrom be used 
to satisfy the lien debts thereon, including· the judgment of 
your complainant and any other judg·ments that may be of 
record; and if it shall appear that the rents and profits from 
said estates will in five years pay the lien debts thereon, then 
the said real estate, with the improvements thereon. if any, 
be rented out and profits therefrom to be applied to the satis-
faction of your Complainant's jndg-ment until the same i11 
duly paid and satisfied, and that your Complainant may have 
.a1l such further and general relief in the premises as the 
nature of this cause may require or which to equity may seem 
meet and proper, and your Complainant will ever pray, etc. 
G. B. vV ALL.NOE & 
GEORGE W. HERRING, 
Co-partners, trading and doing 
business 8.S. Wallace & Herring, 
Complainant, 
Bv: THOMAS, STRAUSS & BACKUS, 
· Counsel for complainant. 
THOMAS, STRAFSS & BACKUS, 
.Attorney~ for Complainant. 
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A.NSW.ER. 
Filecl July 31, 1939. 
To Honorable ·wmiam P .. W oolls, Judge of said Court : 
·" 
This is the joint and several answer of James 1\[ D11ncan1 
,Jr., Administrator of the estate of James M. Duncan, Sr.,. 
deceased, Mary V. Duncan, widow, .James M. Duncan, Jr·~ 
and Ruth B. Dnncan, his wife, Ebner R. Duncan and Dorothy 
A. Duncan, his wife, S. Guy Duncan and Mildred Duncan,. 
his wife, Virginia D. Smith and Harry Lee Smith, her hus-
band, Robert V. H. Duncan, single, and .Julia Duncan, single. 
1 and 2. These defendants are ndt fully aware of the srud 
Complainants suppo8ed judgment nor of the execntion issued 
thereon. 
3. That the allegations of paragraph 3 of'the Bill of Com-
plaint are true. · 
4. That the allegations of paragraph 4 of the Bill of Com-
plaint are true except that there are a great many debts 
of the estate of James M. Duncan, Sr. and James M. Dun-
can, Jr., personal representative has never received any as-
sets to pay off the said debts. 
5 and 6. There are believed to be several claimants and 
judgment creditors against the estate of ,James M. Duncan, 
Sr. having different degrees of priority. 
That the said James M. Duncan, Sr. and his estate is be-
lieved to have land as set forth in paragraph 5· of the Bill or 
Complaint, but the a.mounts of liens or claims are not definitely 
known and should be proven and determined before a Com-
missioner to be appointed in this cause. 
Parcel described as 1 is a vacant lot. 
page 7 ~ Parcel described as 2 consists of a subdivision di-
vided into lots, many of which have been sold, and 
there is a Blanket Deed of Trust on manv lots as set forth in 
the Bill, and some of the lots mentioned° in the said Deed of 
Trust have been sold and should be released. 
7. None of said real estate is susceptible of Partition in 
kind but will have to be sold for the purposes of this suit. 
In consideration whereof these defendants ask for strict 
proof of the allegations in the Bill and of all claims against 
the estate. They join in the prayers to settle the estate of 
.Tames l\L Duncan, Sr., and apply the proceeds of said real es-
tate to the taxes, liens and ilebts so far as possible, and the dis-
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charge of said real estate from any unpaid residue that may 
remain of said debts or liens. That said James M. Duncan, 
Jr., be discharged as Administrator. Tha.t these defendants 
be discharged without costs. That they be given such gen-
eral relief as may be proper. 
EBNER R. DUNCAN, 
J.AMES M. DUNCAN: JR., 
JAMES l\L DUNCAN, JR., 
Administrator, 
MARY V. DUNCAN, 
RUTH B. DUNCAN, 
DOROTHY A. DUN.CAN, 
S. GUY DUNCAN,· 
MILDRED DUNCAN, 
VIRGINIA D. SMITH, 
HARRY LEE SMITH, 
ROBERT V. H. DUNCAN and 
JULIA A. DUNCAN, 
.By ROBINSON MONCURE, 
their counsel. 
ROBINSON MONCURE, 
Counsel for Defendants. 
page 8 ~ DECREE OF REFERENCE. 
Entered August 3. 1.939. 
THIS OATJSE comin~: on to be heard this 3rd dav of Au-
gust, 1939, upon the Bill of Complaint, Answer of Defendants, 
Affidavit of Non-Residence and Order of Publication filed in 
this matter, and having been regularly matured by servfoe 
· of process upon the defendants and by order of publication, 
fully matured, last publication having· been more than ten 
days prior to entry of this order, upon consideration where-
of 
IT IS AD.JUDGED, OR.DERED AND DECREED that this 
cause be and the snme is hereby referred to Hannon E. Norris, 
who is hereby appointed Special Commissioner to inquire and 
make report as follows : 
1. ·what is the real property in tlle C1ty of Alexandria, 
Vircinia, and County of Fairfax, Virginia, of wl1ich ,Tames 
.M. Duncan. Sr .. died seised and possessed, the location thereof 
and its a.ssesAed and market. value. 
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2. The liens thereon, if any: and the order of their priority. 
3. Whether the rents and profits of the said real estate 
will in :five years satisfy the liens thereon. 
. 4. Whether all necessary parties are before the Court in 
this cause and what would be a reasonable fee to be allowed 
counsel for complainant. 
5. Any other matters and things which the Special Com-
missioner may deem pertinent to report. 
And this cause is continued. 
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(S) "\VM. P. ,vooLLS, 
Judge of the Corporation Court .. 
ORDER OF REFERENCE. 
Entered August 22, 1939. 
This cause came on lhis 22nd day of August, 1939, to: be 
heard upon Bill of Complaint and exhibits filing therewith, 
Answer of Defenrlants. Affidavit of Non-Residents and Order 
of Publication filed in this matter, former Decree of Refer. 
ence and the Petition of Bessie M. Posey and Paul L. Posey, 
her husband, and the Decree of this Court permitting them to 
be made parties thereto and this cause having fully matured 
prior to the entry of this Order upon consideration hereof, 
it is adjudged, ordered and deereed that Hannon Ft Norris, 
who was appointed heretofore a special commissioner, be re-
quired to make an additional report as follows, to-wit: 
1. What are the liens due bv the Estate of James M. Dun-
can, on property owned by Bessie M. Posey and Paul L. 
Posey, her husband, in the· County of Fairfax, Virginia, which 
property is known and designated as Lots numbered Six, 
Seven, Eight and Nine (6, 7, 8 and 9) of Block D, of the 
subdivision of W evanoke Hills? 
2. What is the fair value of these lots 7 
3. Whether or not these lots could be assessed with a fair 
and proportionate part of the liens and taxes now due by the 
Estate of James M. Duncan, on these and other properties 
in the County of Fairfax and the City of Alexandria, and if 
so, what would be a fair and proportionate amount to be paid 
by the owners thereof for the release of the said lots of the 
liens of tbe taxes and. judgments thereon. 
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4. Any other matters and things which the Spe-
page 10 } cial Commissioner may deem pertinent to report. 
(S) WM. P. WOOLLS, 
Judge of Corporation Court. 
ORDER OF REFERENCE. 
Entered August 22, l 939. 
This cause came on this 22nd day of August, 1939, to be 
heard upon Bill of Complaint and exhibits filing therewith, 
.Answer of Defendants, Affidavit of Non-Residents and Order 
of Publication filed in this matter, former Decree of Refer-
ence and the Petition of R.obert H. Cox and Rosa M. Keene, 
and the Decree of this Court permitting them to be made par-
ties· thereto and thi~ cat1se having fully matured prior to the 
entry of this Order upon consideration hereof, it is adjudged, 
ordered and dee.reed that Hannon E. Norris, who was ap-
pointed heretofore a Rpecial Commissioner, be required to 
make an additional foport as follows, to-wit: 
1. What are the liens due lw the ]~state of James M. Dun-
can, on property owned by Robert H. Cox and Rosa M. Keene, 
in the County of Fairfax, Virginia, which property is known 
and designated as Lots Numbered 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 
and 36, in Block D and I ,ots Numbered 7, 8, and 9 in Block B, 
of the Subdivision of Wevanoke Hills T 
2. What is the fair value of these lots T 
3. Whether or not these Jolc;; could be assessed with a fair 
and proportionate part of the liens and taxes now due by the 
Estate of ,Tames M. Duncan, on these and other properties 
in the ,County of Fairfax and the City of Alexandria, and if 
so, what would he a fair and proportionat<~ amount to be 
paid h.v the Own<?rs thereof for the release of the· 
page 11 ~ said lots of the liens of the taxes and judgrnent'3 
thereon. 
4. Any other matters and things which the Special Com-
missioner may deem pertinent to report. 
(S) WM:. P. WOOLLS, 
~T udge of Corporation Court. 
3S Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
DECREE. 
Entered August 22,. 193H. 
Term, 1939. 
This cause coming on this day to be again heard by the 
Court upon the bill of complaint and papers formerly filed ancl 
·read, upon the petition of 1,ouis C. Barley, Executor, ~nd 
Margaret E. Truckenmiller (formerly Marga.ret E. Deike),. 
Executrix under the last ·will and testament of the late Har-
ley P. ,vnson, sought to be filed herein, and upon argument 
of counsel. 
Upon consideration whereof the Court, being of the opinion 
that petitioners h.a.ve the right to file their said petition in 
this cause, doth now adjudge, order and decree that peti-
tioners be, and they nre now granted the right to file the 
said petition in this cause, and that the ClP.rk of this Court be~ 
and he is now directed to forthwith issue process against all 
parties made defendant to the said petition returnable to ls.t 
.September rules. 
(S) WM. P. "\VOOLL8, 
Judge .. 
Seen: THOMAS, STRAUSS & BACKUS, 
Counsel for Complainant. 
PETITION. 
Filed August 22, 1939. 
page 12 ~ Louis C. Ba.rley and Margaret E. Truckenmiller 
( f ormer]y 1\!Iar~raret E. Deike), Executor a.nd 
Executrix under the last. will and testament of the late Har-
ley P. Wilson, exhibit this, their petition in tl1e above-cap-
tioned eause, and thereupon say us follows: 
1. Harley P. Wilson~ a resident of Fairfax County, State 
of Virginia., died testate in the said county November 23, 
19R4, appointing as Executor and Executrix under his said 
Will petitioners, who duly qualified as such on the 30th day 
of. November, 1934, before the Clerk of the Circuit Court of 
·Fiairfax County, Virginia, said will having been duly pro-
bated on said date and duly recorded in Will Book No. 15, 
pag·e 313 of the ·wm Books of Fairfax County, State of Vir-
ginia. 
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2. That during the lifetime of the late James 1\L Duncan, 
Sr., who died intestate in the City of Alexandria, Virginia, 
on the 17th day of June, 1936, sundry judgments were ob-
tained against him, which judgments so obtained against him 
were assigned to the late Harley P. Wilson and remain ·at 
this date uncollected, to-wit: 
(a) Judgment of the Miller Rubber Company of New .Y,ork,. 
Inc. v. J. M. D11,ncan (also known as James M. Duncan, Sr.), 
rendered at the October Term, 1928, of the Corporation Court 
of the City of Alexandria, Virginia, for the sum of $.'361.51 
with interest thereon from March 19, 19~8, and costs of $9.53. 
This judgment was duly docketed in the Judgment Lien 
Dockets of th~ City of A.le:xandria, and an execution was duly 
issued thereon, returnable with return of service thereon en-
dorsed under date of April 7j 1928. An abstract of this judg-
ment was duly docketed in Judgment Lien Docket No. 9: page 
26 of the Judgment Lien Books of the ')ounty of Fairfax, Vir-
ginia, on the 2nd day of November, 1928, and said judg·ment 
was duly asi;;igned for value received to tbe late 
page 13 ~ Harley P. ·wilson on July 28, 1931, as shown by an 
abstract of said judgment and assignment filed 
herewith. marked "Exhibit No. A and No. 1" and prayed to 
be read as a part hereof. 
(h) Judgment of F. B. llowa.rd and T. C. Howard! co-
partners, trading a.s F. B. Howard cf; Co. v. James ll.f. Dun-
can, ·rendered at the October Term, 1928, of the Corporation 
Court of the City of Alexandria, Virginia, for the sum of 
$231.71 with interest thereon from October 25, 1928, and costs 
of $1.75. An abstract of this judgment was duly docketed on 
November 2, 1928, in J ndgment Lien Docket No. 9, page 26 
of the Judgment Lien Books of Fairfax County~ Virginia, and 
such judgment was duly assigned for value received to the 
late Harley P. ,vnson on Jan. 15, 1989, as appears from an 
abstract of said judgment and assignment. filed herewith, 
marked "Exhibit No. 2" and prayed to be read as a part 
hereof. That: on the 21st clay of De~ember, 1931, there was 
paid to the said Harley P. Wilson by Carroll Pierce, Trustee, 
the sum of $376.77 to he applied as a credit on this judgment 
and the judgment set forth in paragraph ]ettered " (a) " of. 
this petition. That this is the only credit made upon the two 
said judgments. . 
(c) Judgment of Jnlian F. Chaiincey & Son v. J. llf. .Dun-
can (also known as Jt1_mes H. Dnncan, Sr.) rendered at the 
September Term. 1928, of the Corporation Court of the Citv 
of Alexandria, Virginia, for the sum of $176.80 with interest 
thereon from July 17, 1928, until paid, and costs of $2.25. 
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An abstract of said judgment was duly docketed September 
18, 1936, in Judgment Lien Docket No. 11, page 71 of the 
tT udgment Lien Books of the County of Fairfax, 
page 14 ~ Virginia, and said judgment was duly assigned for 
value received to the lute Harley P. Wilson on 
September 16, 1929, as appears from an abstract of said judg-
ment and assignment filed herewith, marked "Exhibit No. 3" 
and prayed to be read as a part hereof. No payment has been 
made on this judgment, and the entire amount hereof, princi-
pal and interest and costs, is now due and unpaid. 
(d) Judgment of 81,oann B'f'o8 .. , Inc., v. J.M. Ditncan, (also 
known as James M. Duncan! Sr.) rendered at the October 
Term, 1928, of the Corporation Court of the City of .Alexan-
dria, Vir1:,rinia, for the sum of $1.30.00 a.ncl interest thereon 
from July 10, 1928, and costs of $2.25. No execution appears 
to have been issued upon this judgnient. An abstract of said 
judgment was duly docketed September 18, 1936, in Judg-
ment Lien Docket No. 11, pag-e 70 of the Judgment Lien Books 
of Fairfax County, Virginia, and s.aid judgment was duly as-
signed for value received to the late Harley P. Wilson on 
J anua.ry 23, 1929, as appears from an abstract of said judg-
ment and assignment filed herewith1 marked "Exhibit No. 
4" and prayed to be read as a pnrt her~of. No payment ha~ 
been made on this jurlgment, and the entire amount liereof, 
principal. interest, und costs~ is now due and unpaid. 
(e) Judgment. or D. E. Bm1ies.~ v. ,l. M. Duncan (also 
known as .fames :M. Duncan, Sr.) rendered at the December 
Tenn, 1928. of the Corporation Court of t.be ,City of Alexan-
dria., Virgfoia. for the sum of $400.00 and interest thereon 
from October 6, 1928, and costs of $2.25. No execution ap-
pears to l1a.ve been isssuod upon this judg,:nent. An abi:;tract 
of said judgment was duly docketed on the 18th -clay of Sep-
tember, 19R6. in ,Judgment Lien Docket No. 11, page 70 of the 
Judgment Lien Books of Fairfax County, Virginia, 
page 15 ~ and said judgment. ·wns duly assigned for value re-
C'eived to the late Harley P. Wilson on .January 
9, 1929, as appears from an abstract of said juclgn1ent and as-
signment filed ]1erewitb, marked "Exhibit. No. 5" and prayed 
to be read as a part hereof. No payment has been made on 
this judgment and the entire amount thereof, principA 1: in-
terost, and costs, is now due and unpaid. 
(f) Judg·ment of John T. 1Vorthin_qton v. ,lanies M. Duncan 
renclered ::it tlw December Tenn, l 928, of the Corporation 
Court o.f tlw City of Alr.xandria. Vil-ginia, for the sum of 
$526.13 with intere~t thereon from December 27, 1928, and 
costs of $2.25. No execution appears to have been issued 
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upon this judgment.. An abstract of said judgment was duly 
docketed in Judgment Lien Docket No. 11, page 70 of the 
Judgment Lien Books of Fairfax County, Virginia, on the 
18t~ day of September, 1936, and the said ~judgment was duly 
assigned for value received to the late Harley P. Wilson on 
1\Iarch 51 1929, as appears from an abstract of said judgment 
and assignment filed herewitl1, marked "Exhibit No. 6" and 
_prayed to be read as a part hereof. No payment has been 
made on this judgment and the entire amount thereof, prin-
cipal, interest and costs, is now due and unpaid. 
{g) Judgment ?f E. Gor_11u1n Bid,qelv and Tho11ias M. Jones, 
co-pa1·tners trading as R,1,dgely and Jones v. J. M. Duncan 
{H."Jso known as James 1\L Duncan, Sr.) rendered a.t the .De ... 
-cemher Term, 1928, of the . Corporation Court of the City· of 
.Alexandria.: Virginia, for the sum of $78.71 with interest 
thercc,n from November 21, 1927, and costs of $2.25. No exe-
cution appears to have been jssued upon this .judgment. A.u 
.abf-itract of :mid judgment was duly docketed September 19, 
1936, in ,Judgment Lien Docket No. 11, page 71. of 
page 16 } the ~Judgment Lien Books of ~,airfax. .County, Vir-
gfoia, :rnd sai<l judgment was duly asi:igncd for 
value received to the late Harley P. Wilson as appears from 
an abstract of said judgment and assignment filed herewith, 
marked "lDxhibit No. 7" and prayed to be read as .a part 
hereof. No paymen~. has been made on this judgment, and th~ 
entire amount thereof, principal, interest and costs, is now 
due and unpaid. 
{h) ,Judgment of llenrv P. Thomas v. J. M. Dunc.an (also 
known as James M. Dunean, Sr.) rendered at the Decembe1· 
Term. 1928, of tlrn Corporation Court, of the City of Alexan-
dria. Virginia. duly docketed S~ptember 18, 1936, 1 in Ju~g-
ment Lien Docket No. 11, page 71 of the Judgment Lien 
Book8 of Fairfax County, Virgfoia, for the sum of $1Q0.50 
with intere8t thereon from November 9, 1928, as appears from 
an a.b~tract of said judgment which was duly assigned to the 
late Harley P. ,vilson for value received on September lG, 
1929. as appears from Raid abstract of judgment and assign-
ment filed herewith, marked ''Exhibit No. 8" and prayed 
to be read as a part hereof. No payment has been made on 
account of this judgment, and the entire amount thereof~ 
principal, interest and costs, is now due and unpaid. 
· (i) Juclgrnrmt of ,John T. lT7ortMn..oton Y. James M. Duncan 
rendered at the .January 'ferm. 1929, of the Corporation 
Court of th<: City of Alexandria, Virginia, for the sum of 
$319.90 with interest thereon from J :muary 3, 1929, and costs 
of $2.:!f.,. An n bstract of said judgrnen t was duly docketed 
September 18, 1936, in Judgment Lien Docket No. 11, page 
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71 or the Judgment Lien Books of Fairfax County, Yirginia,. 
and fiaid juflgnwnt was duly assigned for value received to 
the late Harley P. "Wilson on March 5, 1929, as appears from 
an abstract of the said judgment and assignment 
pnge- 17 ~ filed herewith, marked '' Exhibit No. £:'' and rrnycd 
to be read as a part hereof. No payment has been 
made on account of said judgment and the entire amount 
thereof, principal, interest and costs, iR now due and unpaid. 
No execution appears to have been issued upon this judgment. 
3. That all of the aforesaid judgments so ,assigned to the 
said Harley P. Wilson now constitute parts of his estate and 
antedate the judgment of the complainants and as such aRsets 
of the estate of the late Harlev P. Wilson are to be co11ected 
and administered by petitioners, and that said judgments con-
stitute valid liens on the land of which the said .Tames ]\[. Dun-
can, Sr. died seised and possessed, both in the City of Alex-
andria, Virginia, and in the County of Fairfax, Virginia, and 
that said judgments should be paid in full with interest and 
costs, b~f ore any sum should be paid on account. of the judg-
ment Ret forth in this cause by, complainant. 
4. That by deed dated September 2, 1931, and not recorded 
until January 13, 1933, in Liber ·Fl, No. 11, page 455 of the. 
land records of Fairfax County, Virginia, James M. Duncan 
Sr .• et ux, conveyed to Cl1arles Henry Smith lots numbered 
41 and 43 of Block 4-1 of a subdivision of land known as '' Al-
fred Higbie's Addition B-Yernon on the Potomac". That 
this deed was recorded subsequent to the docketing in Fair-
fax County, Virginia, of the judgment set forth in sub-para-
graphs "{a)" and "(b)" hereof, and t.J1at the said Charles 
Henry Smith took title to the land so conveyed in the said 
deed, subject to the balance remaining unpaid upon ~he two 
said judgments, and should, the ref ore, be made a party de-
fendant to this cause. 
page 18 ~ 5. That l1y dP.ed of trust dated October 12, 1928, 
and recordeil October 15, 192~, in Liber L No. 10. 
page 454% of the land records of Fairfax County, VirginiR, 
,Tames l\L Duncan, Sr. et ux, conveyed to C. C. Carlin, Jr., 
aR Trustee. lofa numbered 1 to 12 inclusive, and lots numbered 
25, 26 an.d 27, Block 37, and a.11 lots in Blocks 34 and 40 of 
'' Alfred HigbiA 's Addition B-Vernon on the Potomac'' as 
per plat of said subdivision duly recorded in Liber B, No. 8, 
page 119 of the land records of said County, in trust to se-
c_ur~ the payment of a note for the sum of $800.00 of even 
date with said deed of trust, payable one year after date t() 
the order of t.he grnntors of the Raid deed of t.rnst with 
interest thereon at 6%, and two notes in the sum 
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of $24=.0Q each, payahle: to tlie sa_me, with interest 
thereon at 6%, payable at. six and twelve months after date~ 
Petitioners fl.re ad~isech:u~d. brt ~he pas1 s of such inforn.1atioi1 
aver that substantial cnrl.ails nave been made upon ··the. in-
~ebtedn~ss so secured by the said deed of trust, and that the . 
hen of the judgments now held by the estate of the late Har-
ley P. Wilson as hereinbefore set forth attach to and consti-
tute a lien upon the land conveyed in the. said deed· of tr):1st, 
and that the Trustee in said deed of trust should therefore 
be made a· party defendant to this cause and be required to 
disclose the amonnt remaini~lJ unpaid upon said· trust as of 
this date. : ·' 
6. Petitioners ~v:er and charge that the aforesaid judg.;. 
meuts against the said James M. Duncan, Sr., so assigned to 
the late .Ifarley P. ,vilson, and fully set forth in sub-para-
:. graphs '''(a)'' -to· '' ( i) '', both inclusive, hereof; constitute 
, liens upon the re~l es tat~ of which the said James :M: •. Duncan 
died intestate, seised.and possessed, .situated both withi~ tlie. 
City of Alexandria, Virginia, and the ·County' :Pf 
page 19 ~ Fairfax, Virginia. They further aver ~iid chai;ge 
, that, as Executors under the last will and testa-
·. ment of the late Harley P. Wilson, .they occupy the position·-~f 
~ jud:2,ment credito-rs against the estate .of the said '"Tames :NL 
Duncan, Sr.; ·and that, a~ such j,udgment. creditors, they have 
, the right; withont first reviying such judgments at law: !o 
fiJe this petition against the personal represenfatives of the 
,said James l\L Duncan, S_r., h:1testate, deceased, and his heirs 
-at law, to· subject the 1·eal est.ate of which the sai<l ,James M. 
_Duncari, Sr., died ini;estate,. seised and possessed, situ~ted 
within the. City· of Alexanaria, Virgfoia, and the County of 
:Fairfax; Virginia, to .the payment of the aforesaid judgments 
so. recovered . against the said .James M. Duncan during his 
lifetime and duly asi:;ig11ed t~ the said Harley P. Wilson ... Pe-
titioners further aver ~nd chf!rge. that this _petition c;a<_msti:. 
t;utes mr action within the scope of Section 6477 of the Code 
of Virginia for the enforcement .and collection of tl~e. afore-. 
said judgments so _:uisig:r::ted to the _estate of the ·1ate Harl~y 
P; WiJson, ancl tliat all of the said jud~;ments are ,vith_in da~ 
and enforceable and collectib1e from tlle proeeeds of the f:!ale · .. 
of -the real estate· of·:w11ich the said lames M. Duncan,_ Sr., 
died intestate, ·seised and_possessed. Petitioners further ayer · 
and charge tluit tlie rerih, and profits from the ·real estate of 
which the said ,Tames M. :Qnncan, Sr., died seised and pos-
sessed, ,vill ·not, within five years, satisfy the liens of the 
aforesaid judgments and that they nre therefore entitle<l to 
have said real esfat.e subjected by sale t.o the payment· of 
said judgments. 
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In view of the premises, petitioners pray that they may 
be allowed to file this, their petition in the above-captioned 
cause; that proper process may issue hereon; that the real 
estate of whicl1 the said James M. Duncan, Sr., 
page 20 ~ died intestate, seised and possessed, both within 
the City of Alexandria, Virginia, and the County 
of Fairfax, Virginia, or so much thereof as may be necessary 
for the purpose, may be subjected by sale to the payment of 
the aforesaid judgments binding~ thereon; that all proper ac-
counts, orders, and decrees may be entered herein and that 
they may have all such other, further and complete relief as 
the nature of their case may require and as to equity may 
seem meet. 
And to tl1is end petitioners pray that James M. Duncan, Jr., 
Administrator ·of the estate of James M. Duncan, Sr., intes-
tate, deceased, Mary V. Duncan, .James M. Duncan, .Jr., Ruth 
B. Duncan, his wife, Ebner R. Duncan and Dorothy R. Dun-
can, his wife, S. Guy Duncan and :Mildred Duncan, his wife, 
Virginia D. Smith and Harry Lee Smith; her husband, Robert 
L. H. Duncan,. single, Julia Duncan, single, Mary· L. l\foCand-
lish, Executrix of the Estate of F. S. MciCandlish, Trustee, 
deceased, Charles Henry Smith, and C. C. Carlin, Jr., Trus-
tee, may be ~:a.de parties defendant hereto and be required 
to answer the allegations hereof, answer under· .oath being 
hereby expressly waived. 
And as in duty bound, petitioners will every· ·pray, etc. 
LOUIS C. BARLEY, 
Executor under the last will and teetament 
of the late Harley P. Wilson. 
· .. M1\.RGAR]JT E. TRUCI{INM.ILLER, 
.. , Executrix under the last will and testa-
ment of tlie late Harley P. Wilson. 
WILSON l\L FARR, 
Counsel for Petitioners. 
page 21 ~ TESTIMONY OF l\,fR. FREDERICK P. RUS-
SELL 
Filed Oct. 31, 1939. 
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FR.EDERIOK P. RUSSELL, 
being· first duly sworn deposes and says as follows: 
Questions by Commissioner: 
Q. State your full name . 
..A. ~,rederfok P. Russell. 
Q. You are the curator of the E·state of C. C. Carlin, Sr., 
deceased! 
A. I am. 
Q. Have you a list of the assets of the· estatet 
A. No, I have not. 
Q. vVho has a list of such assets 1 
.A.. I don't know. It may be in · the tremendous file that 
was made. 
Q. I direct your attention to the fact that a deed of trust 
dated October 12, 1928, from James M. Duncan, Sr., and wife, 
which was recorded on October 15, 1928, in Liber I, No. 10, 
page 454% of the land records of Fairfax County, Virginia, 
secures the payment of an $800 note with interest at 6% per 
annum. C. C. Carlin, Jr., is trustee in said deed of trust. 
Said deed of trust conveys certain lots which are particularly 
described in the petition rfiled in this suit by Louis C. Barley 
.and Marg·aret Truckenmil1er, Executor and Executrix, re-
spectively, of the estate of the late Harley P. Wilson. Do 
you know whether or·not the late C. C. Carlin lent the $800 evi-
denced by said note to James M. Duncan, Sr. Y 
A. I ha:ve no knowledge of that. 
Q. Do you know whether or not anything has been paid 
on said note? · 
A. No, I do not. know. 
page 22 }- Q. ,vm you consult with the attorneys for the 
estate and look among the papers and records of 
the estate to ascertain whether it owns the note a.nd report 
to me and the balance due thereon, if any. 
A. I will do so at the very earliest possible moment. I have 
a memorandum of the parties and the date. 
Q. Have I permission to Rign your name to this Y 
A.. Yes. 
And further this deponent saith not. 
(S) FREDERICK P. RUSSELL. 
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1• ;-00:MMISSIONER'SREPORT. 
· Filed· October 31,. 1939. 
. 'I 
To the Honorable William P. ··w oolls,' Judge of said C~urt: 
· .. Tlie undersigned Special Commissioner begs leave respect-
fully to report that a Decree of R_eference ·of your Honor's 
· Court was entered in the above cause on the 3rd day of :Au-
·gust, 1939, whereby he was directed to inquire and report to 
the Court as follows : · · ·· 
. 1.. What. is the -real property in the City of Alexandria, 
Virginia, and County of Fairfax, Vfrginia, of which James 
· M.-puncan, Sr-~, died seiz·ed and ·possessed, the- location there-
of and its assessed and market valu~. · · · 
2. The liens thereon, if any, and tJ1e order of their priority. 
3. Whether the renbr and profits of the. said real estate 
will in five years satisfy the liens thereon. · 
4. Whether all necessary p~rties . are before the Court in 
this cause and what would be· a reasonable fee to be allowed 
counsel for ·Complainant. . . 
_page 23 ~ 5. Any other matters and things which the 8pe-
cfal Commissioner niay deem; pertinent to report. 
•. . •' . 
Your ·commissioner gave notice to the parties hereto th~t 
on the 23rd day of August, 1939, at 2 :30 o'clock: P. M., at his 
o~ces located at 109, North Fairfax Street, Alexandria, Vir·-
ginia, he would proceed to execute said decree of refereµc~, 
which notice is herewith returned with the acceptance of serv:. 
ice thereof noted the-reon by John W. Tulloch and Edgar s: 
Bayol, Committee of the person and estate of C. Q. Carlin\ 
Jr., Trustee, anrl by counsel for a.II the other part~es hereto_;· 
Testimony in the form of depositions of witnesses was ad-· 
duced before t~e' S,pecial Commissioner oil the 12th day of., 
September, 193~, th~ hearing having been adjourned to that. 
date from 'Ang-ust 23rd. All of the testimony is ~erewit.h re-
tµrned for the insp~tion of .the Court. · 
1 _Your °.~~missioner, therefore, finds and report~ as fo.ll9ws ;.., . 
1. ·(a.) The real property located in the City of Ale;xandria,. 
Virginia, of which. James M. Duncan, Sr., died ~eized· and ~ 
poss:essea is as f ~Uows: , . · . 
All of that lot or parcel of· ground located on the, south . , 
side of P~ince· S~reet behvecm Patrick- and ~lfre~ St~,eet~, in .. 
. ., ,.· .. ,.. .. . 
~\ . \ ! l 
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the City of .Alexandria and_ bollnded and described as follows, 
to-wit: . , . . . . .. . 
Beginning on the south side. of Prince Street, fiftv:-feet (50)~ 
more or less, east of Patrick Street, und at. a point five feet 
.( 5) east of the east wall of the brick dwelling lately owned 
and occupied by Mrs. E. B. Hooff; and running.thence. east on 
Prince Street twenty-one feet (21), four inches ( 4.); thenc~ 
south and parallel to Patrick Street~ eighty-eight feet (88.), 
more or less, to an alley twenty feet (20) wide, 
page 24 ~ leading into Patrick Street; then.ce west on said 
alley twenty-one (21) feet, four Inches (4); and 
thence north and parallel to Pa trick Street, and in a direct 
line eighty-eight feet ( 88), more or less, to the beginning, 
with right. of way over said alley in common with· others 
entitled thereto, and all rig·hts and appurtenances to the said 
lot belonging. 
Said property was acquired by J_ames M. Duncan and Mary 
:V. Duncan, his wife, by deed dated the 1st day of October, 
1907, recorded in Deed Book ·57, page 320; arpong the land 
records of said city. Said James M. Duncan, Sr. died seized 
and possessed of an undivided one-half interest in said-prQp~ 
erty. The other·half is owned by his widow, Mary V. Dun-
can. 
· The assessed value of this property is $1,771.00, and its 
market value is $750.00. 
· (b.) Tl1e real property located in the County of -F1airfax, 
Virginia, of which James M. Duncan, Sr., died seized and 
possessed, which, for the sake of clearness, is described in 
parcels, is as follows : 
·PARCEL A . 
. · Lots 1-20, inclusive, Block 34; Lots 1-12, inclusive, ·25, 26; 
27, Block 37; · Lots 1-33, inclusive, Block 40; of' the tract· of 
land desi~·nated as Alfrerl Hig'bie's Addition """B"-Vernon 
on the Potomac, as·same·ant>ears of reco1·d amon~ the Fairfax 
Countv Janel records in Ilber B, No. 8, page 119, together with 
the wa:y,s· of ing-ress and egress to a:ncl from said property as 
shown on plat in Liber B, No. -S, page 119, and being t.he same 
_ · , property-acqnired by .J. M. Dnncan from Thomas 
page 25 ~ J. Snyder and Catherine L Snyder, his wife, by 
deed dated .Tune 21, J 928, recorded amon~ the 
Fairfax County ]and records in Liber H, No. 10, page 12. 
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PARCEL B. 
Lots 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10, Block Bl; Lots 32, 33, 3'9, 40, 41, 45 
and 46, Block 86; Lots 15-28, inclusive, B2: 33, and 45-48, in-
clusive, Block 41 of Alfred Rigbie's Addition "B"--Vernon 
on the Potomac, as same appears of record in Liber B, No. 8, 
pag·e 119 of the land records of Fairfax County, Virginia, 
and being a part of the same property acquired by J.M. Dun-
can from Thomas J. Snyder, et ux, by deed. dated July 12, 
1928, recorded in Li her L. No. 10, page 537, of the land rec-
ords of said county. See note on last page of this report. 
PAROEL C. 
Lots 9-17, inclusive, and 34-38, inclusive, Block A; 23, 24, 
and 40-44, inclusive, Block B; Loh; 4-7, inclusive, Lots 11-15, 
inclusive~ 20-23, inclusive, and 3<i-46, inclusive, in Block C; 
Lots 10 and 11, 37-43, inelusivC1, 76-83, inclusive, Block D; 
Lots 8-12 inclusive, 35-39, inchrnive, 53-59, inclusive, 63-65, 
inclusive, 69-83, inclnsiYe, Bloek E; Lots 12-35, inclusive, 39-
74, inclusive, Bloek F; Lots 1-fi4, inclusive, Block G; Lots 
1-26, inclusive, 29-51, inchu:;ive, BloC'k H; Lots 1-23, inclusive, 
25-47, inclusive, Block I, of the subdivision of "\Veyanoke Hills, 
as same appears duly de.rlicated, platted and recorcfod among-
the land records of Fairfax County, Virginia, in Liber J, No. 
9, pag·e 85, and heing part. of the same property· which wa.s 
acquired by J. M. Duncan from Carroll Pierce, Trustee, by 
deed dated September 4, 1924, rrcorded among the land rec. 
ords of said county, in Liher J, No. 9, pag-e 100. 
page 26 ~ PARCEL D 
Consists of a tract of land adjoining the subdivision of 
W eyanoke Hills on the east, between the east line of said sub-
diviRion aud Tnrkev Creek. It is part of the tract. of 56.7'7 
acres acquired by ,J. 1\f. Duncan from Carroll Pieree, Trus-
tee, by deed dated September 4, 1924, recorded among the 
land records of said County in Liber J, No. 9, page 100, and 
is the remainder of said tract after deducting the said sub-
division of Weyanoke Hills. It is assessed as containing 
12.17 acres. 
Before this tract (Parcel D) is sold it should be surveyed 
and described by metes and bounds, so that the commission-
ers of Sale will know what they are selling and the purchaser 
what he is buying. 
·The assessed value of the aforesaid real property is as 
follows: 
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Parcel A assessed as 9.908 acres in Mt. Vernon Dis-
trict, Hunters Station $495.00 
Parcel B assessed as 2.68 acres in Mt. Vernon Dis-
trict, Hunters Station 134.00 
Parcel C assessed as 39.881 acres .Subdivision in Falls 
Church District . 1,435.00 
Parcel D assessed as 12.17 acres Lee Jackson High-
way in Falls Church District 486.00 
The market value of said property is as follows: 
All of the Lots included in Parcels A and B above of Hig-
bie 's Addition '' B' '-Vernon on the Potomae--$514.00. 
All of the Lots included in Parcel C above of the subdivision 
of Weyanoke Hills-$6,854.50. 
As to Parcel C, the Lots in Blocks F, G, H and I and Lots 
53-59, inclusive, 63-65, incl1:1sive> and 69-83, . inclusive, Block 
E, were appraised _on an acreage_ basis. The lots 
page 27 ~ in these blocks agg~·egate 21.97 _acres, according to 
the testimony of the. appraisers, who fixed their 
vahie at $100.00 per acre,. or $~,197 .00. The lots in Blocks 
A, R, C, D and part of Block E were appraised at $4,657.50. 
The appraised value of e~~h of these. Jots is as follows: 
BLOCK A-WEYANOKE 
Lot Price 
9 ........ · .· .. · ......... · .. $135.00 
10 . . . .· ......... ·. . . . . . . . 125.00 
11 ........ · . ." ............. 115.00 
12 ...................... 105.00 
· 13 ............... ·...... 95.00 
14 ... · ................... 185.00 
15 ........ · ............... 175.00 
16 ............. · .... • ...... 165.00 
17 ..................... 155.00 
34 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60.00 
35 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ·60.00 
36. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60.00 
37 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60.00 
38 ............... ·....... 60.00 
Total lots in Block A . . . . . . 14 
Total valuation . . . ...... $1,555.00 
·so Sup:reme Court of · Appeals of Virginia 
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BUOCK B-.WEYA:NOKE 
. . 
23 ...................... . 
24 • • . • . ................ . 
40 ...................... . 
41 ....................... . 
42 •••••..•... • ..•..••...•. 
43 • . . . ....••...........• 
44 ...................... . 











Total valuation ........... $317.50 
~ . ... 
. . . . 
: BLOCK C-WEYANOKE 
.. 
4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60.00 
~ 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60.00 
~6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60.00 
7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60.00 
11. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60.00 
12 . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . 60.00 
13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60.00 
14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60.00 
15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60.00 
20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . 60.00 
21 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60.00 
22. . . . . . . ...... . . . . . . . . . . . . 60.00 
23 . • . . . • . . . . . • . • . . . . . . . . 70.00 
36 . . . • ....... . . . . . • . . . . . . . 70.00· 
37 .......... ,, . . . . . . . . . . 70.00 
38 ... • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70.00· 
39 • . • . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . • 70.00 
40 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70.00 
41 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70.00 
42 • . • . . . . • . . . . . . . • . . . . . . 70.00 
43 . . . . ... ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70.00 
44. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . ... . . 70.00 
45 • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70.00 
46 . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80.00 




Total valuation . . ....... $1,570.00 
L. C. Barley, et als., v. J. M. Duncan, Jr., Adm 'r, etc. Sl 
BLOCK D-WE~NOKE 
10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70.00 
11 ... ·.................. 70.00 
37.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37.50 
38 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37.50 
39 • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37.50 
40 . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . 37.50 
41 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37.50 
42 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37.50 
43 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37.50 
76... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37.50 
77 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37.50 
78 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37.50 
79 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37.50 
80. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37.50 
81 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37.50 
82 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37.50 
83 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37.50 
Total lots in Block D . . . . . 17 
·Total valuation .......... $702.50 
BLOCK E-WEY.&NOKE 
8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70.00 
9... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70.00 
10... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70.00 
11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70.00 
12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70.00 
35 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32.50 
36 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32.50 
37 ............... •.•..... 32.50 
page 29 ~ 38 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32.50 
39 . . • . . . . . . . . . . . • . . • . . . 32.50 
Total lots in Block E . . . . . · 10 
Total valuation . . . ....... $512.50 
The property contained in Parcel D above, estimated as 
containing twelve acres, more or less, is appraised at $100.00 
per acre, or $1,200.00. 
To recapitulate: 
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Value of lot on Prince Street, Alexandria, Va. $ 750.00 
Value of Lots in Parcels A and B, Fairfax County 514.00 
Value of Lots in Parcel C, Fairfax County 6,854.50 
Value of Parcel D, Fairfax County 1,200.00 
See note under 5, infra. Total value $9,318.50 
2. The liens on said properties and the order of their pri-
ority: 
(a.) On the vacant lot in the City of Alexandria, Virginia, 
on the south side of Prince Street, between Patrick and Al-
fred Streets, known as 914 Prince Street: 
Taxes ( including penalty and interest to November 1, 1939) 
Year Amount 
1929 . . . . ................ $27.42 
1930 .................... 26.02 
1931 ..................... 66.86 
1932 ..................... 64.13 
1933 .................... 61.40 
1934 ..................... 58.57 
Half of 1936 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28.20 
1937 ...................... 52.60 
1938 ...................... 49.81 
1939 ...................... 46.05 
There are no certified tax records open for inspection in 
the City of Alexandria, Virginia. Your Commissioner ob-
tained the above figures from the office of the City Collector, 
Alexandria, Virginia. 
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1. The Miller Ritbber Company v. James M. D1mcan. 




Interest from 3/1928 to 8/1/31 
Credit as of 8/1/31 
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To the above balance mnst be added $59.63 for your costs 
Jjaid by Harley P. ·wnson in a chancery suit brought by said 
The Miller Rubber Company in the Corporation Court of 
the City of Alexandria, Virginia, to subject certain real estate 
of James l\I. Duncan to the payment of said judgment. 
Said judgment was docketed on March 19, 1928, in J udg-
ment Lien Docket No. 2, page 80, in the Clerk's office of said 
court, and on N ovem her 2, 1928, docketed. in Judgment Lien 
Docket No. 9, page 26 in the Clerk's office of the Circuit 
Court of Fairfax County, Virginia. Executions were issued 
April 27, 1928, and March 19, 1929, returnable to first June 
Rules and in ninety days respectively, and a return made by 
the City Sergeant on the fi. fa. issued April 27, 1928. 
September 19, 1929, this judgment was duly assigned to 
Harley P. ·wnson, who died testate on November 23, 19'34, 
and now constitutes part of his estate to be collected and 
administered by his Executors. 
2. U. 8. ~l.'ire Company v. James 111. Ditncan 
Date: June 11, 1929, in -Civil & Police Justice's Court, 
· Alexandria, Virginia. 
page 31 } Amount: $127.72, with interest from June 11, 
- 1929, and costs $2.25. 
Fi. fa. : Issued June 25, 1929, returnable in sixty days. 
Docketed : June 26, 1929, in Alexandria City in Judgment 
Lie:r:i Docket No. 2, page 123, and in Fairfax County on July 
14, 1931, in Judgment Lien Docket No. 9, page 174. 
3. Alexandria Ga.zette Corpora,tion v. James M. Duncan 
Date: June 15, 1932, in Civil & Police Justice's Court, 
.Alexandria, Virg'inia. 
Amount: $26.41, with interest from June 15, 1932, and 
$2.25 costs. · 
Docketed: April 26, 1939,. in Judgment Lien Docket No. 4, 
page 178, Alexandria, Virginia. 
4. Snyder Corporation v. James IJ!I. Ditncan. 
Date: February 10, 1933, in Civil & Police Justice's Court, 
Alexandria, Virginia. 
Amount.: $242.70, witJ1 interest from ,Tanuary 23, 1933, 
and $2.25 costs. 
Fi. fa.: Issued on February 10, 1933, returnable in sixty 
flays. 
Docketed: February 10, 1933, in Alexandria City in J udg-
ment Lien Docket No. 3, page 94, and in Fairfax County on 
May 29, 1933, in Judgment Lien Docket No. 10, page 65, 
54 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
5. G. B. Wallace, and George H'. Herring, Co-partners? 
trading and doing business as W a.llace .cf Herring 
page 32 ~ v. James M. Duncan. . 
Date: December 1, 1933, in Civil & Police Jus-
tice's Court, Alexandria, Virginia. 
Amount: $445.38, with interest from December 1, 1933, 
and $2.25 costs. 
Fi fa: Issued December 1, 1933, returnable in sixty days 
with return thereon. 
Docketed: December 7, 1933, in Judgment Lien Docket No. 
3, page 134, Alexandria, Virg'inia, and in Judgment Lien 
Pocket No. 12, page 123, in Fairfax County. . 
6. E. H. Hibb.s and E. H. Geddings, Co-partners, trading 
as Hibbs & Geddings v. Robert Duncan. 
Date: October 6, 1923, before K. C. Spindle, Justice of 
Peace of Fairfax County. 
Amount: $29.50 with interest from March 26, 1923, and 
S;3.05 costs. 
· Fi. Fa.: Issued October 6, 1923, upon which the Sheriff 
made a return. 
Docketed: October 10, 1923, in Judgment Lien Docket No. 
7, page 195, in Clerk's Office of Fairfax County, Virg·inia. 
Note: Your Commissioner does not know whether the 
Robert Duncan in the above judgment is the same person as 
Robert V. H. Duncan, one of the heirs of James M. Duncan, 
deceased. If not the same person, this judgnient should be 
ignored. If the same person, it constitutes a lien on the 
share, if any, of said Robert V. H. Duncan in said estate of 
rT ames :M. Duncan, deceased. 
page 33 ~ 7. lndepenclent Oil Cornpany v. Jmnes M. Dun-
can, Jr., as an individual and tradin.<J as Masonic 
View Ser,vice Station, 8. Guy Duncan wnll Robert V. Divncan. 
Date: December 29, 1937, in Corporation Court, Alexan-
dria, Virginia. 
Amount: $1,680.65, with 6% interest from February 2, 
1937, and costs. 
Pi. fa.: Issued l\farch 2, 1938, returnable in ninety days 
upon which there is no return. 
Docketed: December 29, 1937, in Judgment Lien Docket 
No. 4, page 118, Clerk's Office of Alexandria, Virginia. 
(b.) On the properties in F'airfax County, Virginia: Taxes 
( including penalty and interest to November 1, 1939) 
L. C. Barley, et als., v. ,T. M. Duncan, Jr., Adm 'r, etc. ss· 
PARCEL A 
Year Amount 
1929 . . • . ~ ................ $ 12.98 
1930. . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10:58 
1931 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19.40 
1982 • . . . ..... : . . . . . . . . . . 12.30 
1933 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.91 
1934 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.20 
1 935 . . . . . . . . . . • . • . • . . . . . 11.29 
1936 ......... -. . . . . . . . . . . . 10.76 
1987 • • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10:22 
1938 ..•................ ; 9:98 
i939 . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 9.60 
$130:22 
.PARCEL B 
i928 . • . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.45 
1929 . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.58 
1930 . . . . ~ .... ~ . • . . . . . . . . 5.03 
1981 . . • . .......... ,. .... ~ 5.2i 
1982 . . • . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . 3.26 
1983 . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.26 
i934... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.11 
1935 ............. .- . . . . . . . 3.13 
page 34 ~ Year Amount 
1936 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . 2.98 
1937. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.76 
1938 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.70 




1926 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .. 72.82 
1927 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54.56 
i928 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75.31 
1929... . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73.32 
1930 . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6f.25 
1931 . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68.56 
1932 • . • . . . . . . • • . . . . . . . . . 46.02 
1933... . .. .. . .. . . .. . . . . . . 38.92 




56 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
1935 . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . . 41.59 
1936 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39.94 
1937 . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . 38.24 
1938 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37.20 




1926 ...... ·............... .46.54 
1927 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35.91 
1928 . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. 39.11 
1929 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36.15 
1930... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34.47 
1931 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23.30 
1932 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.66 
1933... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.26 
1934. . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . 13.58 
1935.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.17 
1936 .......... '......... 13.60 
1937 .. ·. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.95 
1938... .. .. . .. . . .. . . .. . .. 12.60 
1939 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.10 . 
$323.40 
Deeds of Trust : 
(a.) J.M. Duncan and Mary V. Duncan, his wife,, 
page 35 ~ to F. S. McCandlish, Trustee, dated September 29,, 
1927, · recorded in Liber C, No. 10, page 287, among 
the laud ree-ords of Fairfax County, Virginia, securing the 
payment of one negotiable promissory note of even date there-
with for the sum of $1,650.00, made by James M. Duncan 
and Mary V. Duncan, payable three years after date. 
'11hiR 110te is now held by Mary L·. l\foCandl_ish, ]Jxccutrix, 
Estate of F. S. l\foCand.lish, deceased, a:nd the balance due 
thereon is $684.17, with interest from June 26, 1930. 
This deed of trust constitutes a lien on Parcel C above 
described, with the exception of Lots 4 and 5, Block C, which 
were relea~ed therefrom by deed of release recorded in Liber 
T. No. 10, page 250, among tl1e land records of Fairfax Coun-
ty, Virg-inia. 
(b.) J. M. Duncan and Mary V. Duncan, his· v.rife, to C. C. 
L. C. Barley, et als., v. ,T. M~ Duncan, ,Tr., .A.dm 'r, etc. 57 
Carlin, Jr., Trustee, dated October 12, 1928, recorded in Liber 
Eye, No. 10, page 454% among the land records of Fairfax 
County, Virginia, securing the payment of a negotiable 
promissory note of even date therewith, for the sum of $800.00, 
executed by said J. lVI. Duncan and Mary V. C. Duncan pay-
able to themselves or order on or before one year after date 
at the First National Bank, Alexandria, Virginia, with inter-
est at 6% per annum from date until paid. Two similar in-. 
terest notes for $24.00 each, evidencing the first year's· in-
terest on said principal note, are also secured by this trust 
deed. 
This deed of trust constitutes a lien on all of Parcel· A 
above described. · 
The holder of this note is not known. Nor is it known 
whether any payments have been made thereon. C. C. Car-
lin, Jr., Trustee is a party defendant to this suit and John 
vV. Tulloch, one of his com.mi ttee a pp eared at the 
page 36 ~ hearing ·before your ·Commi~sioner. The Curator 
of the Estate of C. 0. Carlm, Sr., deceased, also 
appeared before your Commissioner and testified that he 
would try to find the note, if owned by the Estate of C. C. 
Carlin, Sr., and ascertain the balance due thereon. 
Judgment Liens 
The judgment liens on the property known as 914 Prince 
Street, Alexandria, Virginia, above described, are also liens 
fo the order in ·which said judgments are listed above on the 
property located in ~-,airfax County, VirA"inia, described above 
as Parcels A, B, C and D. 
The following- judgments against tT ames M. Duncan, Sr., 
all of which were assigned of record to Harley P. Wilson 
in his lifetime, and are now owned by his estate, are barred 
by the Statute of Limitations: 
Judgment Creditor 
Julian F. Chauncey & 
Sons 
Swann Brothers, Inc. 
Date 
Sept. 25, 1928 
C. & P .. Court 
Amount Judgment Lien Docket 
$176.80 with Book 2, p. 94 
int. from Alexandria 
7 /17 /28 and Book 11, p. 71 
costs Fairfax 
Fi. fa. issued 9/25/28, no return thereon 







Book 11, p. 70 
Fairfax 
Supfeme Cou1·t of Appeals of Virginia 
.r 
Nofi.J<i. 
Ridgely & Jones Dec; 11, 1928 $78.7i with 




Henry P. Thomas lJec. 18, i 928 $100.50 with 
C. & P. Court int. from 
11/9/28 and 
costs 
page 37 r Fi. fa. issued !2/18/28, no return thereon 
John T. Worthington Dec. 27, 1928 
C. & P. Court 
D. E: Bayliss-
John T. Worthington 
Noft.Jd. 
Dec. 27, 1928 
C. & P. Court 
Nofi.fa. 
Jan. 3, 1929 













Book 2, ·P· 102 
Alexandria 
Book 11, p. 71 
Fairfax 
Book 2, p. 104 
Alexandria 
Book 11: p. 7I 
Fairfax 
Book 2, p. 103 
Alexandria 
Book 11, p. 70 
Fairfax 
Book 2, p. 103 
Alexandria 
Book 11, p. 70 
Fairfax 
Book 2, p. 105 
Alexandria 
Book 11, p. 71 
Fairfax 
-Judgment of H. Kirk & Sons, Inc.; dated May 13, 1929, for 
!f;98Q.OO with interest from September 29, 1928, and costs, re~ 
cqrded in Clerk's Office of Alexandria, Va., in Judgment 
Lien Docket No. 2, page 117, upon which no writ of fieri facias 
was ever issued, is also barred. This judgment was never 
assigned. - _ 
The only applicable section of the Virginia Code is 6477. 
In the annotation ti.tJ.der this section; appears the case· of 
11.an.dy and another v._Sm·ith's .Admr., 30 W. Va. 195, 3 S. E. 
604, construing· a sinii]ar West Virginia statute. The facts 
of this case are : 
In April, 1856; plaintiffs, Handy & Bro., recovered a Judg-
ment iu the Circuit Court of Lewis Cottnty, West Virginia, 
for $315.11 against David H. Smith. Successive executions 
issued on the judgment, the last of which was on April 5, 
1869, returnable to June rule of that year. Smith, the judg-
:U. C. Barley, et als., v. J. M. Duncan, Jr., .Adm 'r: etc. 59 
ment debtor, died April 29, 1879, and a suit was commenced 
December 15, 1881, against his administrator and · heirs at 
]aw to subject real estate of which said Smith died seized and 
possessed to the payment of said· judgment. 
page 38 } The Circuit Court held that the judgment was 
barred by the Statute of Limitations, which, upon 
appeal bv plaintiffs, was affirmed. 
The Court said, per Snyder, J.: 
'' The single question presented is whether or not the court 
erred in holding that the plaintiffs' demand is barred by the 
statute of limitations. But it is insisted by the appellants 
that, as Smith died 33 days before the 10 years expired, they 
had, under the second clause of the statute, 5 years from the 
date of the qualification of his personal representative to re-
vive their judgment or bring this suit. It is claimed that 
this provision is a limitation within itself, independent of the. 
10-Years limitation in the first part of statute,; and that 'it 
matters not whether the five years fall wholly within the ten 
years, or wholly without the ten years, in cases not barred, 
or partly within and partly without the same'. This posi-
tion is plainly untenable. The law is well settled that, when 
to a party capable of suing an action has accrued against a 
party who may be sued, the statute begins to run, unless 
this be prevented by the case comirtg within some exception 
to the statute. After it has beg·un to run," its running will 
not be suspended because of the subsequent death of either 
party, or because of the lapse of time before either has a per-
somtl repro.c;enta.tive. 1 R.oh. Pr. (New Ed) 591, 609; Jone.Cl 
v. Lemon, 26 W. Va. 629; Harshberger's Ad1nr. v. Alger, 31 
Gratt. 52, 67; Wilsons v. Harper, 25 W. Va. 179. 
The sec.ond, or :five-years clause, of the statute, is not an 
enlargement but a limitation upon the preceding, or ten~ 
1rMrs, clause. If but five years Qr Jess have expired, then thP. 
creditor has the whole period of five years from 
page 39 ~ the qualification of the personal representative of 
- the execution debtor to sue out his soire facias, 
or bring his suit; but, if more than five years has elapsed 
during the lif~ of such debtor, then the creditor has only the 
remainder of the ten years to revive his judgment, or bring 
his suit. In no event can the judgment be revived, or suit 
hrought to enforce it, after ten years have elapsed from the 
return-day of the last execution.; and, if more than five years 
of that period elapse during the lifetime of the execution 
debtor, then the creditor has only the remainder of the ten 
years within which to revive his judgment or bring his suit, 
although such remainder. may be less than five years, and 
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there may be no personal representative of his estate. Laid-
ley v. Kline's .Adtnr., 23 W. Va. 565, 576. If no right of ac-
tion has ~ccrued against the decedent before his death, then, 
it seems, the statute would not commence to run until his 
administrator had qualified, or until fiye years after his death, 
if the administrator did not sooner qualify. Section 17, c. 
104, Code; 1 Rob. Pr. (New Ed.) 590. 
But in the case at bar the statute beg·an to run, and the 
cause of action had accrued in the lifetime of Smith, the exe-
cution debtor; and, consequently, according to the rule and 
authorities above given, it continued to run, and was not sus-
pended or interrupted by reason of his death, or because he 
had no personal repreRentative. It continued to run up to 
the time of bringing this suit; and, as that was more than 
10 years after the return-day of the last execution issued on 
the plaintiffs' judgment, it was clearly barred.'' 
, This case is exactly in point. The statute began to run in 
1.928 or the early part of 1929 on the Judgments listed above 
as barred, and its running was not suspended by the death of 
James M. Duncan, Sr., on June 17, 1936. This suit 
page 40 ~ was instituted on June 26, 1939, which was not 
within ten years after the dates of the said judg-
ments upon which no writs of fier-i facias were issued, or 
within ten years from the return days of the executions upon 
which no returns were made. 
Sections 5809 of the Virg'inia. Code exc1uding the period of 
one year from the death of any party in the computation of 
time within which to commenc.e any proceeding, does not 
apply to real actions. Steffey v. King, 126 Va. 120, 101 S. 
:m. 62. 
According to the testimony of Judge Louis C. Barley, the 
judgment of F. B. Howard and T. C. Howard, tradinlJ as 
F. B. Howard & Conipany, v. Jmnes M. Ditncan, Sr., for the 
sum of $231.71, entered on October 23, 1928, in the Civil & 
Police Justice's Court of the City of Alexandria, Virginia, 
was paid in full, with interest and costs, on August 1, 1931, 
and should have been released of record. It is docketed in 
Judgment Lien Dockets Nos. 2, page 99 and 9, page 26 of 
the City of .Alexandria and Fairfax County, respectively. 
3. The rents and profits of the said real estate will not 
in five years satisfy the liens thereon. 
4. All necessary parties are before the Court in this cause, 
and a reasonable fee to be allowed attorneys for complain-
ants is $350.00. · 
5. By deed dated September 2, 1931, and not recorded until 
L. C. Barley, et als., v. J.M. Duncan, Jr.1 Adm'r, etc. 61 
~T anuary 13, 1933, in Liber F No. 11, page 455, among the 
land records of Fairfax County, Virginia, James l\L Dun-· 
·Can, Sr.~ et ux, conyeyed to Charles Henry Smith Lots num-
bered 43 and 44, Block 41 of the subdivision known as '' Al-
fred Higbie 's Addition '' B ''-Vernon on the Potomac. The 
judgments of '.The Miller Rubber Company and U. S. Tire 
Company, s·upra, are liens on these two lots. 
page 41 } By deed dated June 25, 1925, but not r~corded 
until September 22, 1930, among· the land records 
of Fairfax County, Virginia, in Liber T No. 10, page 251, 
~Tames M. Duncan, Sr., et ux, conveyed to C. D. Morris ·Lots 
6, 7, 8 and 9, Block D, subdivision of vVeyanoke Hills. By 
deed dated April 14, 1933, recorded in Liber H No. 11, page 
423, among· the land records of said county, these lots were. 
conveyed by said C. D. Morris and Florence Morris, his wife, 
to Bessie :M:. Posey and Paul L. Posey, her husband. The 
Miller Rubber -Company's judgment, supra, constitutes a lien 
on these lots. 
By Deed dated July 16, 1925, but not recorded until May 7; 
1929, in Liber M No. 10, page 4, among the land records of 
Fairfax County, Virginia, James M. Duncan, Sr., et ux, con~ 
veyed to Bertha Cox Lots numbered 28, 29, 30,. 31, 32, 33, 34, 
35 and 36 of Block D, and Lots numbered 7, 8 and 9 of Block 
B in said subdivision of W eyanoke Hills. The said Bertha 
Cox died intestate and her heirs at law are Robert H. Cox 
:and Rosa M. Keene. The McCandlish deed of trust and The 
Miller H,ubber Company's judgment, supra, constitute liens 
in that order on these lots. 
By deed d_ated August 25, 1925, but not recorded until Sep-
tember 16, 1938, in Liber D .No. 13, page 47 4, among the land 
records of Fairfax County, Virg-inia, James M. Duncan, Sr., 
et ux, conveyed lots 43, 44 and 45, Block E, Subdivision of 
W eyanoke Hills to H. 0. Myers. The l\foCandlish deed of 
trust and the judgments of The :Miller Rubber Company, U. 
8. Tire Company, Alexandria Gazette Corporation, Snyder. 
Corporation, Wallace & Herring and Hibbs & Geddings, sitpra, 
constitute liens in that order on these lots. 
page 42 }- The deed to these lots was not recorded until 
after the death of James M. Duncan, Sr. How-
-ever, they are not included under Parcel C, su,pra, as said 
deed was d()livcrcd to H. 0. Myers by James M. Duncan, 
'Sr., in his lifetime. 
Your Commissioner is not advised, and does not report, 
:as to the liens for unpaid taxes, or any other liens, in respect 
of the Smith, Posey, Cox and Myers properties mentioned 
under this heading. The Order of Reference only requires 
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your Commissioner to report on the properties owned by 
James.lvl. Duncan, Sr., at the time of his death, and he is in-
cluding the Smith, Posey and Cox properties he.rein at the 
1·equest of counsel for the estate of Harley P. Wilson. 
Under section 6476 of the Virginia Code the properties 
owned by James M. Duncan; Sr., at the time of his death, 
should first be subjected to the payment of the above-men-
tioned judgment liens before the Smith, Posey, Cox and My-
ers properties are subjected to their payment. 
Another unassigned judgment barred by the statute of 
limitations, which should have been listed, .~upra, is 8. F ~ 
Bowser rt Ca. v. J. M. Dutu:an. 
Date: June Term, 1920, in the Corporation Court, Alex-
andria, Virginia. 
Amount $627 .00. 
, Fi. fa.: Issued July 30, 1920, returnable Second October 
Hules, 1920, but with no return thereon. 
Docketed: July .30, 1920, in Judgment Lien Docket No. 1, 
page 69, Alexandria, Virginia. 
Eppa D. Kane, realtor of Alexandria, stated 
r,age 43 } that the firm of Washington & Kane, of which he 
is a member, has an offer from one R. J ... Wright 
to purchase Lots 10 and 11, Block D, above, for $200.00 cash, 
subject to a flat real estate commission of $25.00 to be paid 
Washington & Kane. This is more than the'appraised value 
of said two lots, and your Commissione:r recommends to the 
Court that the said .offer be accepted. 
As to Parcel B, sitpra : By deed recorded in Liber B, No. 8,. 
page 579, Washington and Potomac Industrial Corporation 
conveyed to one Smoot Lots 3-54, Block 41 ; by deed recorded 
in Liber B, No. 8, page 580, it conveyed to one Daniel Lots 
4-53, Block 41, and by deed recorded in Liber C, No. 8, page 
8, it conveyed to one Dn hant Lots 1-2-3-4-5-54, Block 36, all 
in the subdivision known as Alf red Hig·bie 's Addition '' B '' 
-Vernon on the Potomac. Your Commissioner cannot defi-
nitely report whether or not the descriptions in these deeds 
were of individual lots or were intended to be inclusive. In 
describing in Parcel B, supra, the Lots in Blocks 36 and 41 
of said subdivision ·as owned by James M. Duncan, Sr., at 
the time of bis death, your Commissioner has necessarily 
taken the position that the descriptions contained in the afore-
said deeds to Smoot, Daniel and Dubant cover only indi-
vidual lots. If your Commissioner should be wrong in this, 
and said deeds were meant to be inclusive in their respective 
descriptions of the lots thereby conveyed, James M. Duncan, 
Sr., did not own at the time of his death the lots in Blocks 
L. C. Barley, et als., v. ,T. M. Duncan, Jr., Adm'r, etc. 63 
36 and 41 of said subdivision, above described in Parcel B. 
Respectfully submitted, 
(S) HANNON E. NORRIS, 
Commissioner's f'ee-$800.00. 
Stenographer's f ee-$25.00. 
Special Commissioner. 
Three appraisers @ $50.00 each-$150.00. 
page 44 }- EXCEPTIONS OF LOUIS C. BARLEY AND 
MARGARET E. TRUCKE:NMILLER, (FOR-
MERLY MARGARET E. DEIKE), TO COMMISSION-
ER'S REPORT. 
Filed November 9. 1939. 
Now come Louis C. Barley and :Margaret E. Truckenmiller, 
(formerly Margaret E. Deike), Executor and Executrix un-
der the last will and testament of the late Harley P. Wilson, 
by counsel, and except to the report filed in the above cap-
tioned cause on October 31, 19'39, by Commissioner Hannon 
E. Norris, and assign the following grounds of exception: 
1. They except to the failure of the Commissioner to re-
port definitely as to the present holder of the note secured 
by deed of trust recorded in Liber I, iN o. 10, page 4541h of 
the land records of ltairfax County, Virginia, and the pres-
ent balance unpaid upon the said note. See paragraph (b) 
pag·e 12, of said report, wherein the Commissioner contents 
himself with stating that he has been unable to ascertain the 
present holder of said note so secured by the said deed of 
trust and the present balance remaining unpaid thereon, if 
anv. 
2. They except to the report of the Commissioner that the 
sundry judgments set forth under the caption, "Judgment 
Liens, pages 13 and 14'' of said report, to-wit, the following 
judgments there set up as judgments recovered ag·ainst James 
:M. Duncan, Sr., all of which were reported by the Commis-
sioner as having been assigned to the late Harley P. Wilson, 
to-wit, the judgments of JuHan F. Channcey & Son, Swann 
Bros .• Inc., R.idgely & Sones, Henry P. Thoma~, 
page 45 }- John T. Worthington, E. E. Bayliss and John T. 
Worthington, are now barred by the Statute of 
Limitations, and to the failure of the said Commissioner to 
report said judgments as valid and subsisting liens upon the 
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estate, real and personal, of the said James M. Duncan, Sr. · 
'rhey except to the statement of the Commissioner on page 
14 of the said report that the only applicable section of the 
Virginia Code bearing on the validity of said judgment is 
Section 6477, and to the conclusion of the -Commissioner that 
the validity of said judgment is controlled and determined 
solely by the ruling of the Supreme Court of Yv e,st Virginia 
in the case cited by the Commissioner of Handy and another 
v. Smith's .Admr., 30 W. Va. 195, 3 S. E. 604. 
3. They except to the conclusion of the Commissioner set 
forth on pages 15 and 16, of his report to the effect that Sec-
iion 5809 of the Virg·inia Code, excluding the period of one 
year from the death of any party in the computation of time 
within which to commence any proceedings does not apply 
to the aforesaid judg·ments assigned to and now constituting 
a part of the estate of the late Harley P. Wilson because the 
present suit is a real action. Real actions are for the recovery 
of land only-at common law a free hold estate only, but by 
Statute generally a less estate than free hold may also be re-
covered. In this Commonwealth the onlv real actions are 
unlawful Entry or Detainer or Forcible Entry which with us 
are purely statutory. 
4. They except to the report of the Commissioner under 
inquiry 4, page 16 of his report wherein he states that a rea-
sonable attorney's fee to be allowed compl~inants' counsel 
is $350.00, if by said report, the Commissioner intends to 
state that such counsel shall be paid from the general fund 
in. this cause, $350.00. If on the contrary he 
page 46 r means that such fe<? s11oulcl be paid complainants' 
· counsel by their clients, no exception is taken. 
5 : They except to the failure of the Commissioner to re- _ 
port that the judgments hereinbefore set forth and reported 
by him as being barred by the Statute of Limitations are not 
liens upon the lots conveyed by the said .James M. Duncan, 
Sr., et ux, during· his lifetime, to Charles Henry Smith, 0. D. 
Morris, Smith, Posey, and Myers set up on pages 16 and 17 
of said report under paragraph numbered 5. They except 
to the failure of the Commissioner to clarify and report 
definitely as to the effect on ownership by James M. Dun-
can, Sr., of the lots in Block 36 and 41 of "Alfred Higbie's 
Addition "B"-Vernon on the Potomac", as set forth on 
pages 18 and 19 of said report. 
6: In the absence of supporting vouchers showing the time 
expended by the Commissioner in the preparation of the said 
report, compensation for which time is provided by the Stat-
ute law of this State, they except to the fee of $800.00 sug- . 
gested by the Commissioner as the proper fee for his report, 
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.as on the face of the report the said fee is in excess of the 
proper allowance to Commissioner for said report. · 
7 : They except to the failure of· the Commissioner to re- . 
vort as valid and subsisting liens against the estate of the late 
James M:'L)Duncan and binding upon the real estate in the 
bill and proceedings mentioned, the aforesaid judgments ob-
tained against the said James M. Duncan, Sr., during his life-
time, and assigned to the late Harley P. Wilson, and now con-
stituting a part of the estate of the said H~rley P. Wilson, 
which judgments are set forth on pages 13 and 14, of the 
report of the Commissioner and as hereinbefore stated, are 
reported by him as being barred by the Statute of 
JJage 47 ~ Limitations, because the said Commissioner erred 
in so reporting the said judgments as being barred, 
.as, said judgments, and each and every one of them, with in-
terest accrued on the principal thereof and the c<;>sts in eaoh 
proceedings, are, under the Statute law of this State, and 
under the decisions of the Court of Appeals of this State, 
valid and subsisting judgments to which they are entitled 
· to payment, either by sale· of the real estate of which the 
said James M. Duncan, Sr., died seised and.possessed, pr by 
sale of such part thereof as may be necessary to fully satisfy 
and discharge said judgments. · 
Repectfully submitted, 
LOUIS C. BARLEY, . 
MARGARETE. TRUCKE,NMILLER 
(formerly Margaret E. Deike), 
Executor and Executrix under the last will and 
testament of the late Harley P. Wilson. 
R.R. FARR, 
By "WILSON l\L FARR, 
By Counsel. 
OPINION OF JUDGE WM. P. WOOLLS. 
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After examining the pleadings, Commissioner's report, ex-
ceptions thereto and the authorities cited in argument on the 
exceptions, I am of the following opinion : 
Exception No. 1 is overruled. From available evidence 
the Commissioner's inability to name the present holder of 
a negotiable note ( one maker and the last known holder be-
ing dead) did not constitute error. Such amount as will se-
cure principal and interest can be deposited with the Gen-
eral Receiver mitil the notes are presented, released or found 
not to he a lien. 
Exceptions Nos. 2 and 3 are overruled. The Commission-
er's finding that the lien of the judgments and any suits to 
enforce said lien were barred at the expiration of ten years 
from January 3, 1929, I believe to be correct. The liens of 
Raid judgments and any action to enforce them under the 
facts in this matter are barred after ten years from January 
3, 1929, ( the date of the last judgment, and there being· no 
execution or return subsequent to this date), by 
page 49 } the provisions of Section 64 77 of the Code of Vir-
ginia. The exceptions to this Section set forth 
in Section 6478 are not pertinent to this case. I do not be-
lieve Section 5809 of the Code applies; if it did there would 
be no necessity for some of the exceptions of Section 6478. 
Section 5809 is part of Chapter 238, limitation of suits, and 
Aections 6477 and 6478 are not a part of this Chapter, nor 
related to it but pertain to limitation of proceedings on judg-
ments. 
Further, under the opinion expressed in Ha.rper, et als., v. 
Harper, et als., 159 Va. 210, this proceeding- is a real action, 
and in Steffey v. King, et al., 126 Va. 120, (the only case in 
L. C. Barley, et als., v._ J.M. Duncan, Jr., Adm 'r: etc. 67 
which our Court has passed on the relation or irrelation of 
Section 5809 to real actions) the Supreme Oourt of Appeals 
held that Section 5809 did not apply to real actions. The 
cases prior to S'teff ey v. King, et al., do not construe the ap-
plicability of Section 5809 (then Section 3577) to real actions 
for in Jame's Erx:ec-utor, et als., Y. L-ife, 92 Va. 702, the plain-
tiff was within the time limit independently of this section, 
and Fadeley's Administrator v. Williamis' Administrator, 9.6 
Va. 397, was not a suit to ·subject real estate. Nor do the 
cases subsequent to Steffey v. King, et al., for in those its 
pertinence ha.d to do with matters other than rc·al actions, 
Williams' Administrator v. Dean, et als., 144 Va. 831, and 
Rennolds, et a.ls. v. Williams, 147 Va. 196, having to do with 
its inapplicability to writs of error and appeals, and Harper, 
et als., v. H arpe'1·, et a.ls., 159 V.a. 210, dea1t with ai personal 
action on a note. 
Also, the opinion in Steffey v. K·ing, et al., was delivered 
in 1919. In 1922 the legislature with this construction before 
it (that Section 5809 did not apply to real actions) 
page 50 } amended Section 5827 ( a Section which dealt with 
certain statutory limitations of real actions) to 
provide that a period of one year from the death of any 
party in interest be excluded from computation of time. It 
did not amend Section 5809. It is to be presumed that the 
legislature intended Section 5809 to remain as construed, 
namely, .not to apply to real actions. 
Exception No. 4 is sustained. 
Exception No. 5 is oYerruled. 
Exception No. 6: ],rom the testimQny of the Commissioner 
that the bill of $500.00 contracted by him for examination of 
title is a fair one, and the time devoted to his inquiries, I 
think $750.00 ( of whieh the title item is a part) is reasonable 
and proper. The exception is, therefore, sustained to this 
extent. 
E~ception No. 7 is overruled. 
If you gentlemen wi11 prepare a de(~ree in accorclanc.P. with 
the above, I wiU be glad to enter it upon presentation. 
Very truly yours, 
mh/ (S) WM. P. WOOLLS. 
DECREE. 
Entered February 1, 1940. 
ThiR cause came on this day to be a~ain heard upon the 
bill of complaint and papers formerly filed and read, upon 
the report of Hannon E. Norris, Special Commissioner, filed 
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herein pursuant to a decree of reference heretofore entered 
herein, upon the written not.ice. of the time and place qf tho 
execution ·of the order of reference, duly given to 
page 51 }- all parties in interest by said Commissioner, upon 
the· evidence taken before said Commissioner, 
which has been duly certified and returned to this Court by 
the said Commissioner with his said report, upon the written 
notice duly given to all parties of the filing of said report 
of said Commissioner, upon the exceptions filed to said report 
by Louis C. Barley and Margaret E. Truckenmiller, (formerly 
Margaret E. Deike), Executor and Executrix under the last 
will and testament oft.he late Harley P. ·wilson, upon the tes-
timony of Hannon E. Norris, the same being embodied by 
agreement in the affidavits of Hannon E. Norris, John P. 
Strauss and Franklin P. Backus filed herein by consent of all 
counsel, and upon argument of counsel. 
Upon consideration whereof, the 'Court having taken un-
der advisement the said exceptions and arguments thereon, 
as well as the authorities cited by counsel, is of the opinion 
for the reasons assig·ned in writing· and filed in this cause; 
that Exceptions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 7, filed to said report, are not 
well taken, doth adjudge, order and decree that the said Ex-
ceptions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 7 bf), and they a1~e hereby overruled, to 
which action of the Court the said Louis C. Rarley and :Mar-
g·aret E. Truckenmiller, (formerly Margaret E. Deike), Ex-
ecutor and Executrix under the last will and testament of 
the late Harley P. Wilson, by their counsel, excepted; but the 
Court is of the opinion that Exception 4 is well taken and 
that Exception 6 is to the extent hereinafter set forth well 
taken, and it is adjuclg·ed, ordered and decreed that Excep-
tion No. 4 filed to said report is sustained and that said Ex-
c~eption 6 filed to said report is sustained to the extent of 
fixing the fee of said Commissioner at $750.00 instead of 
$800.00; and that in all other respects the said re-
page 52 ~ port is ratified, approved and confirmed. 
It is further adjudged, ordered and decreed that 
Robinson Moncure, R. R-. Farr and Henry P. Thomas are 
hereby appointed Special Commissioners of Sale for the pur-
pose of selling all of the real estate of which James l\L Dun-
can died seised and possessed as the same is described in the 
report of the Commissioner Hannon E. Norris, and the Com-
missioners of Sale shall Rell the same upon terms of one-third 
(1/3) cash and the balance at six, (6), twelve (12), and eigh-
teen (18) months after date of sale to be evidenced bv 
the purchaser's interest bearing notes, secured by· retention 
of title until paid in full, either at public or private sale and 
either as a whole or in parcels, but if they shall sell at a 
• 
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public sale, they shall first advertise the terms, time and place 
-0f sale twice a week for two successive weeks in a newspaper 
published in Alexandria City, Virginia, and once a week for 
two successive weeks in a newspaper published in Fairfax. 
County, Virginia. 
Before entering into their duties hereunder one of the saicl 
8pecial Commissioners of Sale shall enter into a bond before 
the Clerk of this C'ourt, in the penalty of $10,000.00, with ap-
proved surety, conditioned as the law provides. 
And the said Louis C. Barley and Margaret E. Trucken-
miller, ( formerly l\farg·aret E. Deike), Executor and Execu-
trix, respectively, under the last will and testament of the 
Jate Harley P. Wilson, have indicated that they desire to ap-
}Jeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia., for an ap-
peal from sueh parts of the foregoing decree as overrules 
their said exceptions and confirms said report, to which said 
exceptions were filed, it is further ordered upon 
page 53 } their motion that the execution of this decree is 
suspended for the period of sixty days from the 
rising of the Court so that they may take an appeal from 
this decree, if they be so advised, provided they, or some one 
~wting for them, shall enter into bond in the Clerk's office 
of this Court within fifteen days from the entry of this de-
,cree, in the penalty of' $500.00, with surety approved by the 
Clerk and conditioned as provided by law. 
And tl1is cause is continued. 
(S) WM. P. WOOLLS, Judge. 
APPLIC.A.TION FOR TRANSCRIPT OF RECORD. 
Filed February 27, 1940. 
To. Mr. Elliott F. Hoffman, Clerk of said Court: 
Iu ar.cordnnce with the provisions of Section 6342 of the 
Cod(} of Virginia (Michie's 1936), we, the undersigned, coun-
sel for the sundry parties complainant and defendant in the 
above-r.aptioned cause, hereby agree that in the preparation 
of the record in the said cause to he made bv vou as such 
Clerk applied for by Louis C. Barley and Margaret E. Truck-
enmi.ller ( nee Margaret E. Deike), Executor and Executrix 
under the last will ahd testament of the late Harlev P. Wil-
~on, that you shall copy and include in such transcript of 
the record so_ applied for, only the following papers: 
• 
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· · 1. The original bill of complaint filed in said suit on July 
19,. 1939, by Wallace & Herring.· 
2. The answer filed to said original bill of complaint on 
July 31, 1939, by James M. Duncan, Jr., Administrator, et 
als. 
page 54 ~ 3. The decree of reference entered in said suit 
ou August 3, 1939. 
4. The decree of reference entered in said suit on August 
22, 1939, on the petition of Bessie M. and Paul L. Posey. 
5. The decree of reference entered in said suit on August 
22, 1939, on the petition of Robert H. Cox and Rosa M. Keene .. 
6. The decree entered on August 22, 1939, granting leave 
to Louis C. Barley and :Margaret E. Truckenmiller (fo_rmerly· 
Margaret E. Deike}, Executor and Executrix oft.he late Har-
ley-·P. Wilson, granting them leave to file their petition in 
said cause. 
7. The petition of said Executor and Executrix filed in 
said cause on AugJISt 22, 1939, pursuant to the last mentioned 
,lecree. 
8. The report of Commissioner Norris filed in said suit on 
October 31, 1939. 
Sa. Deposition of Frederick P. Russell. 
9. The e:Xc~ptions filed to said report by Louis C. Barley 
and Margaret E. Truckenmiller (formerly Margaret E .. 
Deike), Executor and Executrix of the late Harley P. ,vnson, 
on November 9, 1939. 
10. Th~ memorandum of opinion filed in said cause by 
,T udge Vv oolls on February 1, 1940. 
, ] 1. The decree entered in said cause by Judge W oolls on 
]'ebruary 1, 1940, passing on the exceptions to the report of 
Commissioner Norris and appointing Commissioners of S'ale 
to ma.ke sale of the real estate in the bill and proceedings 
mentioned. 
12. J nclude in the record the following: 
"It is hereby stipulated and agreed by aII parties to this 
cause that process was regularly and duly issued 
page 55 ~ and served on the petition filed therein on August 
22, 1939, by Louis C. Barley and Margaret E. 
Truckenmiller (formerly Margaret E. Deike), Executor and · 
Exooutrix of the late Harley P. Wilson; that process on said 
petition was duly issued on the 22nd day of August, 1939, 
and tha~ said petition was regularly aiid properly matured 
for henrmg; and that the late Harley P. Wilson died testate 
on the 2Rrd day of .November, 1934, and that the said Louis 
C. Biu·ley and Margaret E. Truckenmiller '(formerly Mar-
garet E. Deike), ExecutQr and .Executrix appointed under 
L. C. Barley, et als., v. ,T. M. Duncan, Jr., Adm'r, etc. 71 
the last will and testament and codicil thereto of the said 
Harley P. Wilson, duly qualified as such on the 30th day of 
November, 1934. '' 
THOMAS, STRAUS.S & BACKUS, 
·ny FRANKLIN P. BACKUS, 
Attorneys for G. B. Wallace and George W. Her-
ring·, co-partners, trading and doing business 
as Wallace & Herring. 
ROBINSON MONCUR.E, 
ALBERT V. BRYAN, 
Attorneys for James M. Duncan, Jr., Adminis-
trator of the estate of James M. Duncan, Sr., 
dec'd., Mary V. Duncan, James M. Duncan, 
Jr., Ruth B. Duncan, Ebner R. Duncan, Doro-
thy R. Duncan, S. Guy Duncan, Mildred Dun-
can, Virginia D. Smith, Harry Lee Smith, 
Robert L. H. Duncan, ,Julia Duncan. 
JAMES KEITH, 
Attorney for Mary L. l\foCandlish, Executrix of 
the estate of F. S. McCandlish, Trustees, de-
ceased. 
R.. R. FARR & W. l\L FARR, 
Attor1ieys for Louis C. Barley and Margaret E. 
Truckenmiller (formerly Margaret E. Deike), 
Executor and Executrix under the last will and 
testament and Codicil of the late Harley P. 
,vnson. 
pag·e 56 ~ THOMAS, STRAUSS & BACKUS, 
Attys. for Alexandria Gazette Corporation and 
Snyder Corporation. 
HANNON E. NORRIS, 
Attorney for U. S. Tire Company. 
J. R.A:NDOLPH F. DA VIS, 
Atty. for Bessie M. & Paul L. Posey & Robert 
II. Cox and Rosa 1\1. Keene. 
CHARLES HENRY SMITH, 
EDGAR S. BAYOL, 
Committee for Charles C. Carlin, Jr., Trustee. 
INDEPENDENT OIL CO., A CORP., 
By E. JOEL TREGER, 
Its Attorney. 
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page 57 ~ CLERK'S CERTIFICATE. 
in the Corporation Court of the City of Alexandria; VirginbL 
I, Elliott F, Hoffman, ·Clerk of the Corporation Court of the 
City of Alexandria, do certify that the within pages consti-
tute a true transcript of the Court Record in. the suit of 
'1eorge It "\Vallace and George W. Her.ring~ co-partners, trad-
ing and doing business as W allacc and Herring, v. James M. 
Dunean, Jr., Administrator of the Estate of James M. Dun-
ean:, Sr., dee.eased, et als. 
I do further certify that appeal bond in the sum of $500.00 
was given with surety approved by me as good and sufficient. 
Given uftdet my hand this 2nd day of March, 1940, at the 
Co11rthouse of the City of Alexandria, Virginia. 
ELLIOTT F. HOFFMAN, Clerk. 
A Copy--Teste: 
M. R. "\V ATTS, C. C. 
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